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Abstract 
Age related degradation effects in safety related systems of nuclear power plants should be managed to prevent safety margins 
from eroding below the acceptable limits provided in plant design bases. The Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Pro- 
gram, conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Nuclear Regulatory 
Research, and other related aging management programs are developing technical information on managing aging. The aging 
management process central to these efforts consists of three key elements: 1) selecting structures, systems, and components 
(SSCs) in which aging should be controlled; 2) understanding the mechanisms and rates of degradation in these SSCs; and 
3) managing degradation through effective inspection, surveillance, condition monitoring, trending, record keeping, mainten- 
ance, refurbishment, replacement, and adjustments in the operating environment and service conditions. This document 
concisely reviews and integrates information developed under the NPAR Program and other aging management studies and 
other available information related to understanding and managing age-related degradation effects and provides specific refer- 
ences to more comprehensive information on the same subjects. 
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1 Introduction 
For several years the Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Programi has been developing technical understanding of the 
processes that, through time-dependent age-related degradation of systems, structures, and components (SSCs), could reduce 
operational safety margins in operating nuclear power plants (NPPs) below acceptable limits. Complementary aging 
management programs are conducted by the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), Office of Regulatory Research 
(RES); these programs focus on the development of improved nondestructive examination techniques and on understanding 
and managing age-related degradation of NPP pressure vessels, piping steam generators, and civil structures. Parallel 
programs, focused on developing the understanding needed to improve the reliability and prolong the useful life of NPP SSCs, 
have been instituted under the guidance of the Electric Power Research Institute (EPRI). Similar programs are being 
conducted in other countries, and complementary programs are being conducted to improve aging management practices in 
other industries, such as United States commercial and Air Force aviation programs, the U.S. Navy Extended Operating Cycle 
Program for nuclear submarines, and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) programs to develop 
improved non-destructive examination techniques. 
Pacific Northwest Laboratory (PNL)' conducted this review to consolidate the information being developed by these programs 
in a form that is "user friendly" for both the NRC staff and NPP licensees. Because of its summary nature, the information 
contained in this report is not intended to be sufficiently detailed to satisfy all applications. Extensive references have been 
provided to guide the reader to more comprehensive specific sources when needed. 
1 .I Organization 
Part 1 of this report reviews information on understanding and managing aging of long-lived, passive, nomedundant systems 
and components. Understanding and managing aging for other SSCs that have been subjects of NPAR investigations are 
reviewed in Part 2. 
Each section of the report addresses a particular SSC and describes the aging concerns and mechanisms as well as approaches 
to managing the degradation. Further subdivisions are made where significant differences exist between boiling water reactors 
(BWRs) and pressurized water reactors (PWRs) SSC aging issues. References are provided at the end of each section. 
1.2 Terminology 
Terminology used in this report follows consensus definitions developed by a technical committee composed of members from 
the utility industry and regulatory research (Grant and Miller 1992). 
1.3 Aging and Research Programs 
The status and accomplishments (through calendar year ICY] 1990) of the NPAR Program are reviewed by Vora (1991); 
Bosnak (1992) gives an updated overview of the program. 
All reports generated in the NPAR Program (through September 1993) are summarized and indexed by Vora (1993); this 
report has been updated annually for 4 years. 
'Conducted under the auspices of the Division of Engineering, Office of Nuclear Regulatory Research (RES), U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC). 
PNL is operated by Battelle Memorial Institute for the U.S. Department of Energy. 
Scott et al. (1992) summarize pertinent insights regarding aging management practices of the United States commercial airline 
industry, the U.S. Air Force B-52 bomber program, the U.S. Navy ballistic submarine fleet, and the Japanese nuclear power 
industry. 
1.4 General Guidance 
Christensen (1992), Dukelow (1992), and Vora and Burns (1989) are good sources for general information regarding the need 
for, and the processes necessary to establish, effective aging management programs. 
Blahnik et al. (1992), Fresco et al. (1993), Gunther and Taylor (1 990) and Shah and MacDonald (1993) are good sources for 
summary reviews of insights gained from specific NPAR activities. 
1.5 References 
Blahnik, D.E., D.A. Casada, J.L. Edson, D.L. Fineman, and W .E. Gunther. 1992. Insight Gained From Aging Research. 
NUREGICR-5643, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Bosnak, R. 1992. "NRC Plant Aging Research Program-Overview." In Proceedings of the Aging Information Conference. 
NUREGICP-0122, Vol. 1, pp. 15-28, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Christensen, J.A. 1992. "Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants," Nucl. Eng. Design, B:245 .  
Dukelow, J .S . 1992. Recordkeeping Needs to Mitigate the Impact of Aging Degradation. NUREGICR-5848, U. S . Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Fresco, A., M. Subudhi, W. Gunther, E. Grove, and J. Taylor. 1993. Managing Aging in Nuclear Power Plants: Insights 
From NRC Maintenance Team Inspection Reports. NUREGICR-58 12, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, 
D.C. 
Grant, W.S., and E.J. Miller. 1992. Nuclear Power Planr Common Aging Terminology. EPRI TR-100844, Electric Power 
Research Institute, Palo Alto, California. 
Gunther, W., and J . Taylor. 1990. Results from the Nuclear Plant Aging Research Program: n e i r  Use in Inspection Activ- 
ities. NUREGICR-5507, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Scott, W.B., W.I. Enderlii, A.D. Chockie, and K.A. Bjorklo. 1992. "Good Practices for Effective Maintenance to Manage 
Aging of Nuclear Power Plants," Nucl. Eng. Design, 134:257. 
Shah, V . N . and P. E. MacDonald, eds . 1993. Aging and L f e  Extension of Major Light Water Reactor Components. 
Blsevier Science Publishers, Amsterdam, The Netherlands. 
Vora, J.P. 1991. Nuclear Plant Aging Research (NPAR) Program Plan. NUREG-1144, Rev. 2, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Vora, J.P. 1993. NRC Research Program on Plant Aging: Listing and Summaries of Reports Issued llrough September 
1993. NUREG-1377, Rev. 4, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Vora, J.P. and J.J. Burns. 1989. "Understanding and Managing Aging and Maintenance." In Proceedings of the Inter- 
national Nuclear Power Plan Aging Symposium, ed. F.A. Beranck, NUREGICP-01000, pp. 28-38, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, D.C. 
2 Reactor Pressure Vessels 
The reactor pressure vessel (RPV) is part of the reactor pressure coolant boundary, as defined in 10 CFR 50.2. As such, the 
RPV cames the NRC Quality Group A designation and, except where specifically exempted by the provisions of 10 CFR 
50.55a, must meet the requirements for the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) Class 1 components as set 
forth in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code. 
The primary functions of the RPV are to contain the reactor coolant and to provide a bamer to fission product release. In 
addition, the RPV supports the vessel internals, control rods. and core and directs the reactor coolant flow that facilitates the 
transfer of heat generated in the core to the steam turbine (boiling-water reactor [BWR]) or steam generator [pressurized-water 
reactor WWR]). 
This chapter reviews aging degradation of RPV components in PWRs and BWRs. Aging of other systems and components 
that comprise the reactor coolant pressure boundary is reviewed in Chapter 4, and aging of the RPV internals is reviewed in 
Chapter 3. 
2.1 PWR Pressure Vessels 
This section addresses the aging degradation of the low alloy femtic steel and stainless steel components that comprise the 
PWR pressure vessel. This includes the closure head dome (which cames the control rod drive mechanism housings, vent 
tubes, liiing lugs, refueling seal ledge, and shroud support ring), the closure head flange, closure stud assemblies (composed 
of studs, nuts, washers, and O-rings), the vessel flange, the upper shell course (including primary coolant nozzles, safety 
injection nozzles, and leakage monitoring tubes), intermediate and lower shell courses (including the core support lugs), and 
the bottom head dome (including the instrument tube penetrations). The function of each of these components is largely 
self-explanatory. These components are shown in Figure 2.1. 
Pressure vessels of PWRs constructed after 1963 comply with the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section ID, which 
permitted about 25% lower wall thickness than the previous Sections I and VIII, but required a more extensive nondestructive 
examination of the welds. Although earlier RPVs were fabricated from welded plate sections, later vessels.used ring forgings 
for the shell courses, thus eliminating the longitudinal welds. The upper shell course is about 30% thicker than the others to 
account for the nozzle penetrations. Nozzles are also forgings. Although welddeposited stainless steel is used for the vessel 
internal cladding (to mitigate corrosion), Alloy 600 is used in local regions where Alloy 600 components are attached. The 
cladding is generally not included in estimates of vessel-wall strengths. Postweld heat treatments are used to reduce residual 
stresses. 
2.1.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR pressure vessels are summarized in Table 2.1. In order of priority, the 
most important concerns are radiation embrittlement and fatigue cracking. The most important sites for concern on the RPV 
are the weldments in the beltline region, weldments at the housings for the control rod drive (CRD) mechanisms and in-core 
instrument penetrations, and the flange closure studs. 
Embrittlement is more of a concern for PWRs than BWRs because of the thinner water annulus surrounding the core in the 
PWR, which results in neutron fluences 20 to 100 times higher. Radiation embrittlement of the beltline region (composed of 
the intermediate and lower shell courses) is most important for the beltline weldments, because low-copper, damage resistant 
pressure-vessel steel (SA533B-1) has become standard for the shell courses (the base metal). The welds are more easily 
Figure 2.1 Typical PWR pressure vessel (Sewer et al. 1987) 
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Table 2.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR pressure vessels 
embrittled than the base metal because of copper, nickel. and phosphorous impurities, because of the dissimilar metals joined 
together, and because of the presence of the heat-affected zones (HAZs) of the weld. 
Embrittlement raises the reference temperature for nil ductility transition (RT,,,) and lowers the upper-shelf energy (USE) for 
Charpy impact tests. The result is that the allowable pressuretemperature (PT) operating range of the plant may be restricted. 
The USE of about twenty U.S. PWRs may fall to below 50 ft-lb by the end of their initial license periods. Such reductions 
often result in a lowering of the low temperature overpressure protection setpoint. The most serious unanticipated 
transient that can exceed the PT limits is pressurized thermal shock (PTS), the low-temperature overpressurization, and rapid 
cooldown of the downcomer coolant while at relatively high primary system pressure. 
PWR RPV Component 
Beltline region, shell, 
nozzles, cladding 
Coolant outlet and inlet 
nozzles 
Instrument penetrations 
and CRD housings 
Flange closure studs 
Degradation by fatigue cracking can occur for the beltline weldments (due to normal operating pressurelthermal cycling and 
abnormal events), closure head studs (load cycling due to normal operation and maintenance), primary coolant inlet and outlet 
nozzles (due to thermal cycling), and instrument penetrations and CRD housings (due to thermal cycling). The thermal cycling 
can be caused by normal operating thermal transients, such as heatup or cooldown associated with servicing and by a number 
of unanticipated or design transients (see Shah and MacDonald 1993, p. 31). 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Aging Mechanisms 
Radiation 
embrittlement; 
Environmental fatigue 
Fatigue 
Fatigue; IGSCC; Boric 
acid corrosion 
Fatigue; Boric acid 
corrosion 
Although crack initiation generally occurs at or near strain concentrations, such as nozzle welds, PWRs generally do not 
accumulate enough cycles to initiate cracks. Initiation is predicted by the classical S-N approach (stress vs. the number of 
cycles for failure). Crack growth rates are predicted using the linear elastic fracture mechanism approach, which depends on 
initial crack length. The initial crack length is one of the most uncertain parameters in the equations, unless it has been 
carefully measured (e.g., by ultrasonic methods). Predicting the growth of small cracks is also difficult because it often 
requires an extensive material database and an elastic-plastic analysis. Difficulty increases when the effects of the environment 
are incorporated into the analysis. Sulfur (from the manganese sulfide inclusions in the base metal or weld) can si
gnifi
cantly 
accelerate crack growth rates in oxygenated water environments. Fatigue damage can be more limiting than embrittlement for 
RPVs fabricated from low-copper steels. 
References* 
pp. 29-3 1 
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Reg. Guide 1.99 Rev. 2 
10 CFR 50.61 (PTS) 
p. 57 
p .  53 
p. 53 
p. 32 
Generic Letter 88-05 (NRC 
1988a); pp. 32 & 53 
Materials 
SA508; SA533B-1; 
SA336; SA508; Stainless 
steel; Alloy 600 
SA508 
SB166: SB 167 
SA540-B23 and B24 
Other issues of aging, such as corrosion-assisted fatigue cracking in the vessel cladding, are of lesser importance, although 
CRD housings made from Alloy 600 are susceptible to intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC). General corrosion 
and stress corrosion cracking are usually not a problem in PWR vessel cladding because benign conditions for stainless steel 
are maintained by adherence to proven water chemistry guidelines (Wood 1990). On external surfaces, boric acid corrosion 
can degrade the flange and closure studs if not managed properly. 
Aging Concerns 
Loss of fracture 
toughness; Crack 
initiation and growth 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Crack initiation and 
growth; Loss of material 
2.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
There are three broad categories of management options available for managing radiation embrittlement of the beltline region: 
mitigation, inspection and surveillance, and repair. There are three approaches to mitigate embrittlement: the reduction of 
thermal stresses, flux reductions, and thermal annealing. 
The options for managing aging degradation of PWR pressure vessels are shown in Table 2.2. Reductions in thermal stresses 
during operation can be approached by training operators to avoid or eliminate certain off-normal sequences. A more 
expensive option is to change the plant design to minimize stress concentrations, such as increasing the temperature of the 
emergency core cooling system (ECCS) water. The neutron flux can be reduced by improved fuel management, such as the 
"low-leakage loading pattern," or by shielding the beltline welds. The latter must be implemented early in the RPV life to be 
effective, and consists of replacing some fuel pellets with stainless steel balls in the weld region. The thermal annealing option 
for mitigation of embrittlement can be accomplished either wet or dry, the latter offering the most complete recovery of vessel 
ductility. Guidance for this procedure is found in ASTM E 509. Because there are no established methods for predicting 
reembrittlement after annealing, post-anneal measurements are essential. Samples from the vessel wall will also be required 
to check the through-thickness annealing response. 
There are two methods of vessel inservice inspection: ultrasonic examination and acoustic emission. Ultrasonic examinations 
are usually performed to characterize flaws in weldments and HAZs, per Section XI of the ASME code. The significant 
uncertainties in this method, especially for underclad flaws, have resulted in conservative regulatory requirements for use of 
these flaw estimates to set PT limits and evaluate PTS events. Section XI of the ASME code requires four inspections at 
10-year intervals, during which 100% volumetric inspections are required for all shell, head, shell-to-flange, nozzleto-vessel, 
and repair welds in the beltline region. This provides a close monitoring of possible fatigue crack initiation and growth. 
Smooth, sharpedged flaws normal to the vessel surface and in the embrittled beltline region are the most important for PTS, 
but are also difficult to detect and characterize. Some advanced ultrasonic methods have been developed for this purpose 
(Shah and MacDonald 1993, p. 65). Acoustic emission monitoring can be used for on-line monitoring of crack growth if the 
outside surface of the vessel is accessible. 
Table 2.2 Managing aging degradation in PWR pressure vessels 
L 
PWR RPV 
Component 
Beltline region, 
shell, nozzles, 
cladding 
Coolant outlet 
and inlet 
nozzles 
Instrument 
penetrations and 
CRD housings 
Flange closure 
studs 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MscDonald (1993). 
Materials 
SA508; SA533B-1; 
SA336; SA508; 
Stainless steel; Alloy 
600 
SA508 
SB166; SB167 
SA540-B23 and B24 
Aging 
Mechanisms 
Radiation 
embrittlement; 
Environmental 
fatigue 
Fatigue 
Fatigue; 
IGSCC; Boric 
acid corrosion 
Fatigue; Boric 
acid corrosion 
Management Options 
Stress cycle reductions; Thermal 
annealing; Flux .reductions; vessel 
anneal; Ultrasonic inspection of 
welds; Acoustic emission; 
Surveillance programs; Weld repair 
Stress cycle reductions; Plant FT 
history records 
Stress cycle reductions; Coolant 
chemistry control; Materials 
changes; Inspections 
Volumetric and surface inspections; 
Replacement 
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Managing embrittlement by surveillance programs is a regulatory requirement. The typical surveillance program consists of 
placing at least three samples of the base metal, the weld metal, and the HAZ metal in small irradiation capsules. The capsules 
are then placed between the RPV inner wall and the core thermal shield at the beltline level. Because the flux is higher than at 
the vessel wall itself, the fluence of the surveillance samples leads that of the vessel by factors of 1 to 5. The sample material 
is usually archive material. When this is not available, reconstituted samples or surrogate materials (ASTM E 1253) can be 
used if properly justified. The specimen withdrawal schedule is dictated by ASTM E 185. Results from Chaxpy impact testing 
to find the RT,,, and USE of these specimens provide estimates of radiation embrittlement that are then compared with 
predictive methodologies such as Regulatory Guide 1.99 Rev. 2 (NRC 1988b) and ASTh4 E 900. Correlation monitor 
materials also placed in the surveillance capsules serve to verify fluences and temperatures. ASTh4 E 636 provides additional 
information on supplemental testing of the surveillance samples. However, note that ASTM E 900 and Regulatory Guide 1.99 
(NRC 1988b) do not provide guidance for temperatures outside the nominal range of 274 to 310°C (525" to 590°F). 
The last option for the aging management of beltline welds is by repair. The shielded metal arc weld using the temper bead 
technique is acceptable in the ASME code and does not require a postweld heat treatment. However, this is a labor-intensive 
procedure and may be subject to strain aging. The gas tungsten-arc weld method is suited to remote operations inside the 
vessel, requires no heat treatment, and is less susceptible to strain aging. 
Options for managing the fatigue degradation of coolant nozzles, instrument penetration, and CRD housings by minimizing 
thermal cycle occurrences and severity (by training and redesign, respectively) were discussed in the fust paragraph of this 
section. Modeling of the fatigue damage to corroborate measurements requires that the plant PT history be carefully recorded 
for the analysis of crack growth by the damage tolerant fracture mechanics approach. Management of the fatigue and corro- 
sion of the flange closure studs is by volumetric and surface inspections, along with replacement of defective studs. 
2.2 BWR Pressure Vessels 
This section addresses the aging degradation of the low alloy ferritic steel and stainless steel components that comprise the 
BWR pressure vessel. This includes the vessel beltline and other courses, beltline weldments, vessel flange, vessel top and 
bottom heads, closure studs, support skirt, attachment welds for the vessel internals, nozzles, penetrations, and safe ends. 
These components are shown in Figure 2.2. Components belonging to the reactor vessel internal systems are not included. 
Control rod drive mechanisms are also not included. 
All BWR pressure vessels in the United States were constructed from formed and welded plates. Vessels constructed after 
about 1970 used a low-alloy femtic steel with low copper content to reduce susceptibility to radiation embrittlement. The 
vessel inner surface is clad with welddeposited stainless steel to inhibit general corrosion. In older vessels, the cladding was 
either not applied or was removed in specific local areas so that vessel internals could be welded to the low-alloy steel. In 
newer vessels, the cladding has been classified as a structural material, and the internals are welded to the cladding. The 
entire vessel is subjected to a stress relief heat treatment after all welds are completed. 
The vessel top head, flange, and closure studs permit sealing of the RPV after refueling operations, etc. The many nozzles on 
the BWR pressure vessel handle coolant flow to and from the core, along with control rod drives on some designs. The safe 
ends are essentially short sections of piping welded to the nozzle, and provide a stable location for welding the coolant piping 
to the nozzle. Penetrations occur in the lower head and permit insertion of control rod drives and core flux monitors. 
2.2.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for BWR pressure vessel are summarized in Table 2.3. In order of priority, the 
primary mechanisms of concern are IGSCC, thermal and mechanical fatigue, and radiation embrittlement. 
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking can occur at vessel nozzle and attachment welds due to the combination of high residual 
and applied stresses, a high coolant electrochemical potential, and the use of Alloy 182 weld materials. Specific BWR 
nozzle-to-safe end welds that have been susceptible to IGSCC are the recirculation system inlet, core spray, and feedwater. 
Attachment welds for the control rod drive stub tubes have also been susceptible. A vessel with a very low femte content in 
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Control rod 
Figure 2.2 Typical BWR pressure vessel (Mikesell and Sewer 1987) 
Table 2.3 Aging degradation concerns for BWR pressure vessels 
the cladding can be sensitive to interdendritic IGSCC. Repairs for these components have included some nozzle redesign, 
replacement of the weld material with corrosion resistant Alloy 82, and control of the hydrogen water chemistry. 
However, increasing the coolant hydrogen can also have adverse effects, such as increased steamline radiation fields, increased 
radioactivity deposition on some surfaces, increased erosion-corrosion of carbon steel components, and &creased hydrogen 
absorption by fuel cladding. Closure studs occasionally exhibit SCC due to unexpected material deficiencies, wear of 
protective coatings, and moist environments. 
References' 
p. 645 
p. 642 
p. 645 
p. 647; Reg. Guide 1.99 
p .  645 
p. 641 
Boiling-water reactor vessels were designed for fatigue using the classic S-N curve (stress vs. number of cycles for failure) 
approach and test data from polished samples in air atmospheres at room temperature. Safety factors of 2 for stress and 20 for 
cycles were applied. Although the fatigue strength of low-alloy steels does not fall below the ASME design curves, the safety 
margins are substantially reduced by exposure to high temperature oxygenated water (such as BWR coolant) during low-cycle 
fatigue tests. The above safety factors only partially account for the environmental effects. However, environment has little 
effect on high-cycle fatigue because the high strain rates do not allow sufficient time for chemical reactions to occur at typical 
kinetic rates. Corrosion fatigue is accelerated by the oxygen and sulfur in the BWR environment, although there appears to be 
a stress threshold below which such acceleration is not observed. 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Aging Mechanisms 
Intergranular stress 
corrosion cracking 
High-cycle thermal 
fatigue 
Wear; Fatigue; Stress 
corrosion cracking 
Radiation 
embrittlement 
Thermal and 
mechanical fatigue 
Interdendritic SCC 
BWR RPV Components 
Nozzle welds (incl. instr. and 
CRD); Attachment welds 
Nozzles (feedwater and CRD 
return) 
Closure stud assemblies; 
Flanges 
Beltline shell and weld 
External attachments 
Vessel cladding 
Nozzles on feedwater and CRD hydraulic return lines have experienced cracking from thennal fatigue. Turbulent mixing of 
the cooler feedwater and hotter coolant near the feedwater nozzle can cause thermal fluctuations, of up to 42°C (108°F) and 
up to 1 Hz, and have resulted in initiation of high-cycle fatigue cracks up to 6 mm (0.24 in.) deep. 
Low-cycle corrosion fatigue during heatup, cooldown, etc., have propagated the cracks through the cladding and into the base 
metal, to a total depth of 38 mm (1.5 in.). The cracks have been repaired by grinding or remachining the nozzles. Stratified 
flows and turbulent mixing have also caused circumferential cracking in the vessel walls up to 200 mm (7.9 in.) away from the 
CRD return line nozzles, which were repaired similarly. The main closure stud assemblies and flanges are also subjected to 
low-cycle fatigue. 
Materials 
SA508 Class 2; Alloy 
182 (welds) 
SA508 Class 2; 
Stainless steel cladding 
SA193, SA540; SA508 
Class 2 
SA533B-1; Proprietary 
welds 
SA533B-1 
Low femte stainless 
steel 
Radiation embrittlement causes loss of fracture toughess in the RPV beltline region, where the fluence is highest. Older 
vessels were fabricated from materials that contained small amounts of copper, nickel, and phosphorus, which increase radi- 
ation embrittlement. Newer vessels (after 1970) were fabricated from materials with reduced Cu, Ni, and P impurities (Reg. 
Guide 1.99, Rev. 2). Radiation embrittlement causes changes in two key regulatory parameters: increases in the reference 
Aging Concerns 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Crack initiation; Low- 
cycle crack growth 
Leakage; Crack 
initiation and growth 
Loss of fracture 
toughness 
Crack initiation and 
growth; Ductile 
overload 
Crack initiat~on and 
growth 
ductile-to-brittle transition temperature (RT,,,) and decreases in the USE for fracture by the Charpy V-notch test. Weldments 
are usually more susceptible to these changes than the base metal. Radiation embrittlement by fast neutrons (> 1MeV) is less 
important for BWRs than for PWRs because of the greater amount of moderating coolant water between the reactor core and 
the vessel shell. However, embrittlement may impose constraints on BWR cold hydrotest procedures, and may limit the range 
of acceptable operating transients in older plants. Irradiation-assisted stress corrosion cracking (IASCC), corrosion, 
erosion/corrosion, fretting and wear, and stress relaxation appear to be negligible problems for BWR pressure vessels. 
2.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
The options for managing aging degradation in BWR pressure vessels are outlined in Table 2.4. The aging effects of IGSCC 
on nozzle and attachment welds can be managed by five approaches: materials-related remedies, temporary repairs, control of 
hydrogen water chemistry, ultrasonic examinations, and visual inspections. Materials-related remedies include replacement of 
the Alloy 182 welds with the corrosion-resistant Alloy 82, or a more temporary repair by weld overlaying Alloy 82 on top of 
the original Alloy 182 weld. Other related nozzle repairs have included replacement of the safe end with a new material and a 
nozzle design change to eliminate a crevice which promoted corrosive chemistries. IGSCC of nozzle and attachment welds 
can also be effectively suppressed by control of hydrogen water chemistry in the primary coolant. However, the high 
hydrogen injection rates have several disadvantages (Shah and MacDonald 1993, p. 647). Ultrasonic examination and visual 
inspections of nozzle and attachment welds in the beltline region of BWR pressure vessels are severely hampered by lack of 
accessibility, even for designs completed after the ASME Section XI Code was implemented (1971). Many of the beltline 
nozzle welds have not been inspected since construction, and the blanket exemption previously granted by the NRC may not be 
available in the future. Remotely operated inspection systems are being developed. 
The aging effects of thermal and mechanical fatigue on fedwater and CRD return line nozzles may be managed by periodic 
ultrasonic inspection. This has been done from the external surface using a phased array ultrasonic method. However, these 
nozzles may also be inspected for fatigue cracks on internal surfaces with the traditional liquid penetrant method, which is 
more difficult because of accessibility problems. On-line monitoring of temperatures and coolant flow and pressure, coupled 
with leakage monitoring, has also been used in place of liquid penetrant testing. An SCC monitor may also be employed to 
estimate IGSCC crack growth (Shah and MacDonald 1993, Chapters 19 and 22). 
Table 2.4 Managing aging degradation in BWR pressure vessels 
BWR RPV 
Components 
Nozzle welds (incl. 
Instr. and CRD); 
Attachment welds 
Nozzles (feedwater and 
CRD return line) 
Closure stud 
assemblies; Flanges 
Beltline shell and weld 
External attachments 
Vessel cladding 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Materials 
SA508 Class 2; Alloy 
182 (welds) 
SA508 Class 2; 
Stainless steel cladding 
SA193, SA540; SA508 
Class 2 
SA533B-1; Proprietary 
welds 
SA533 B-1 
Low ferrite stainless 
steel 
Aghg mechanisms 
Intergranular stress 
corrosion cracking 
High-cycle thermal 
fatigue 
Wear; Fatigue; Stress 
corrosion cracking 
Radiation embrittlement 
Thermal and mechanical 
fatigue 
Interdendritic SCC 
hlanagement options 
Materials-related remedies; 
Temporary repair; Hydrogen 
water chemistry; Ultrasonic 
examination; Visual inspection 
Ultrasonic inspection or liquid 
penetrant on-line monitoring 
Surface and volumetric 
inspections; Replacement 
Volumetric inspection; 
Surveillance samples 
Volumetric and surface 
inspections 
Visual examination 
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The aging effects of fatigue, wear, and SCC on closure stud assemblies and flanges can be managed by in situ ultrasonic test- ' 
ing during outages (an angle beam technique seems preferable), and by replacement if cracked studs are identified. Wear and 
fretting of studs and flanges can be identified by visual inspection of the surface condition. 
Radiation embrittlement of the beltline shell and welds can be managed by remotely controlled ultrasonic inspection. When 
accessibility permits, both inside and outside remote inspection equipment have been developed. Still, not all welds can be 
reached in older vessels. Thus, at least three surveillance capsules containing specimens most susceptible to radiation 
embrittlement (e.g., HAZ of weldments) are placed adjacent to the vessel inner wall. These specimens are withdrawn accord- 
ing to a schedule and tested for fracture toughness (see Shah and MacDonald 1993, Chapter 3). 
Aging degradation due to fatigue of vessel external attachments, such as the support skirt, can be managed by periodic ultra- 
sonic and visual inspection, which can be performed remotely in most cases with advanced equipment. Similar equipment can 
be used to check the vessel interior cladding for stress corrosion cracks. This can be performed while the internal attachment 
welds are being inspected. 
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3 Reactor Pressure Vessel Internals 
This chapter reviews aging degradation of RPV internals in PWRs and BWRs; aging degradation of the RPVs is addressed in 
Chapter 2. The internal components of light-water reactor (LWR) pressure vessels provide orientation and support for the 
reactor core and guide and protect the control rod drive assemblies. They also provide a passageway, support, and protection 
for in-vessel instrumentation and direct water flows as necessary. 
3.1 PWR Pressure Vessel Internals 
This section addresses the aging degradation of ferritic steels, wrought austenitic stainless steel (SS), cast austenitic stainless 
steel (CASS), and nickel base alloy components that comprise the PWR reactor vessel internals. The review covers the Upper 
Internals Assembly components (such as the upper support plate, upper core plate, upper support columns, and in-core 
instrumentation guide tubes), the Core Support Assembly components (such as the core support shield, core barrel, shroud 
assembly, thermal shield, and upper core plate alignment pins), and the Lower Internals Assembly components (such as the 
lower core plate, lower support plate, lower support columns, radial keys, clevis inserts, secondary support structure, and 
in-core instrumentation guide tubes). The PWR internals support the reactor core, the control rod assembly, the core support 
structure, and the irradiation surveillance specimens; direct the flow of reactor coolant; and provide shielding for the reactor 
pressure vessel. Specific components vary among the three domestic PWR reactors designed by Babcock and Wilcox (B&W), 
Combustion Engineering (CE), and Westinghouse; Figure 3.1 shows the layout for a typical PWR plant. 
3.1.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Internals of PWRs are manufactured from wrought and cast stainless steels, ferritic steels, and high-temperature nickel alloys. 
These materials have been susceptible to cracking, leakage, and failure from fatigue, IGSCC, and irradiation and thermal 
embrittlement under the complex stresses from thermal plant transients, flow-induced vibration, high-temperature corrosive 
environment, radiation, and bolting preloads. Aging degradation concerns considered to be sigtuficant for PWR internals are 
1) crack initiation and growth due to crevice cracking and IASCC from stresses concentrated at weld regions and at 
geometrical discontinuities, thermal and mechanical cycling of these weldments, the coolant water, and neutron irradiation; 2) 
attrition of pins, ribs, and flanges caused by mechanical wear; 3) loss of fracture toughness of core support and lower internal 
assembly components due to neutron irradiation and thermal embrittlement; 4) loss of preload of bolts due to stress relaxation; 
and 5) cumulative fatigue damage to components due to high- and low-cycle fatigue. These significant aging degradation 
concerns and their mechanisms are summarized in Table 3.1. 
3.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
A summary of options for managing significant aging degradation in PWR internals through inservice inspections, surveil- 
lance, monitoring, repair, and replacement is provided in Table 3.2. A primary requirement for aging management is to 
ensure against loss of core restraint and guidance and protection of control rod drive assemblies due to irradiation-assisted 
stress corrosion cracking and emblittlement. 
Reactor internals are difficult to inspect. Visual inspection of accessible areas of reactor internals can provide information on 
physical damage, leakage, and mechanical and structural condition. Inservice inspection of all flangeclosure stud-bolting each 
time the head is removed enables removal of degraded components. Components removed to a pool or remaining in the vessel 
can be inspected by remote camera. Ultrasonic inspection is difficult to apply and to interpret. Eddy-current inspection is 
effective in measurement of tube or pipe thinning. Loose-parts monitoring systems are complex (Weiss and Mayo 1991). 
More effective remote inspection tools are needed. 
As for the pressure vessel, higher operating temperatures should retard the rate of radiation embrittlement in the reactor 
internals and water chemistry management should prevent the initiation of stress corrosion cracks in attachment welds. 
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Figure 3.1 Arrangement of Westinghouse PWR internals (Ware 1989) 
Table 3.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR vessel internals 
Accurate records of operating cycles and transients for reactor vessel and internals provide key information required to 
evaluate fatigue usage factors and can be used to enhance the effectiveness of inspections. Vibration monitoring and trending 
can assist preventive maintenance planning. 
3.2 BWR Pressure Vessel Internals 
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This section addresses the aging degradation of wrought austenitic SS, CASS, and nickel base alloy components that comprise 
the BWR vessel internals. The review covers the major BWR intemals, which are (from bottom to top of the vessel) the core 
plate assembly, fuel supports, jet pump assemblies, core shroud, top guide, core spray lines and spargers, feedwater spargers, 
shroud head, and steam separator and dryer assemblies. The BWR internals provide orientation and support the reactor core; 
guide and protect the control rod assemblies; provide passageway, support, and protection for in-vessel instrumentation; direct 
the flow of reactor coolant within the pressure vessel; separate steam from water; and provide emergency core cooling water 
to the fuel assemblies. The layout for a typical BWR plant is illustrated in Figure 3.2. 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
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Irradiation-assisted 
stress corrosion 
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3.2.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging Concerns 
Crack ilutiation 
and growth 
Loss of fracture 
toughness 
Loss of function 
Crack initiation 
and growth 
Loss of preload 
Loss of fracture 
toughness 
Cumulative 
fatigue damage 
Components 
AU components 
Guide tubes; fuel alignment plate; 
upper core barrel flange, upper core 
plate alignment pins; fuel alignment 
pins; radial keys and clevis inserts 
Guide tube bolts: upper support col- 
umn bolts; baffle and former assembly 
bolts; fuel alignment pins; lower sup- 
port column bolts 
Upper support columns; lower 
support plate; lower support columns 
Upper support plate; guide tube; 
guide tube bolts; upper support 
column bolts; core barrel nozzles; 
upper core plate alignment pins; lower 
core plate; lower support columns 
BWR intemals are manufactured from wrought and cast SS, femtic steels, and high-temperature nickel alloys. These 
materials have been susceptible to IGSCC, cracking from fatigue, irradiation and thermal embrittlement, leakage, and failures 
from the high-temperature corrosive coolant, prolonged exposure to high neutron fluxes, thermal transients during plant 
heatups and cooldowns, high preload stresses in bolts and studs, and flow-induced vibrations (Shah and MacDonald 1993, pp. 
765-776). Aging degradation concerns considered to be significant for BWR internals are crack initiation and growth due to 
Materials 
SS; Nicrobraze; Ni 
alloys; CASS; Stellite 
SS, Nicrobraze: Ni 
alloys 
SS; Ni alloys 
CASS 
SS; Nicrobraze; Ni 
alloys 
Table 3.2 Managing aging degradation for PWR vessel internals 
IGSCC and IASCC from stresses concentrated at weld regions and at geometrical discontinuities, thermal and mechanical 
cycling of these weldments, the coolant water, and neutron radiation. An aging concern specific to the BWR internals is the 
deposition of minerals on the internal surfaces of the jet pumps. These significant aging degradation concerns and their 
mechanisms are summarized in Table 3.3. 
3.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Components 
All components 
Guide tubes; fuel alignment plate; 
upper core barrel flange; upper core 
plate alignment pins; fuel alignment 
pins; radial keys and clevis inserts 
Guide tube bolts; upper support 
column bolts; baffle and fonner 
plates; assembly bolts; fuel alignment 
pins; lower support column bolts 
Upper support columns; lower 
support plate; lower support columns 
Upper support plate; guide tube; 
guide tube bolts; upper support 
column bolts; core barrel nozzles; 
upper core plate ahgnment pins; 
lower core plate; lower support 
columns 
A summary of options for managing sign
if
cant aging degradation in BWR internals through inservice inspections, surveil- 
lance, monitoring, repair, and replacement is provided in Table 3.4. A primary requirement for aging management is to 
ensure against loss of core restraint, guidance, and protection of control rod drive assemblies, and emergency core cooling due 
to IGSCC and IASCC. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Irradiation-assisted stress 
corrosion craclung 
Radiation embrittlement 
Wear 
Stress corrosion cracking 
Stress relaxation 
Thermal embrittlement 
Fatigue 
Materials 
SS. 
Nicrobraze; Ni 
alloys; CASS; 
Stellite 
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Nicrobraze; Ni 
alloys 
SS; Ni alloys 
CASS 
SS; 
Nicrobraze; Ni 
alloys 
Reactor internals are difficult to inspect. Visual inspection of accessible areas of reactor internals can provide information on 
physical damage, leakage, and mechanical and structural condition. Insewice inspection of all flangeclosure stud-bolting each 
time the head is removed enables removal of degraded components. 
Components removed to a pool or remaining in the vessel can be inspected by remote camera. Ultrasonic inspection is diff- 
icult to apply and to interpret. Eddy-current inspection is effective in measurement of tube or pipe thinning. Loose parts 
monitoring systems are complex (Weiss and Mayo 1991). More effective remote inspection tools are needed. 
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Figure 3.2 Arrangement of BWR internals 
Table 3.3 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for BWR vessel internals 
Components 
Jet pump 
Access hole cover; control blades: 
control rod drive housing; tubes 
Control blades; core shroud head bolts; 
core spray sparger; monitor tubes 
Core shroud 
Control blades; control rod drive 
housing; core shroud head bolts; core 
spray internal piping; core spray 
sparger; monitor tubes; jet pump; 
orificed fuel support; steam dryer 
support bracket 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
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Table 3.4 Managing aging degradation for BWR vessel internals 
As for the pressure vessel, higher operating temperatures should retard the rate of radiation embrittlement in the reactor 
internals and water chemistry management should prevent the initiation of stress corrosion cracks in attachment welds. 
Accurate records of operating cycles and transients for reactor vessel and internals provide key information required to 
evaluate fatigue usage factors and can be used to enhance the effectiveness of inspections. Vibration monitoring and trending 
can assist preventive maintenance planning. 
3.3 References 
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Management Options 
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system leakage and hydrostatic test 
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4 Reactor Coolant Pressure Boundary 
1 The reactor coolant pressure boundary (RCPB) is defined in 10 CFR 50.2 as those pressure-containing components, such as 
1 pressure vessels, piping, pumps, and valves, which are: 
I (1) Part of the reactor coolant system, or 
I (2) Connected to the reactor coolant system, up to and including any and all of the following: 
1 (a) The outermost containment isolation valve in system piping which penetrates primary reactor containment, 
@) The second of two valves normally closed during normal reactor operation in system piping which does not penetrate 
primary reactor containment, 
I (c) The reactor coolant system safety and relief valves. 
I For B WRs, the reactor coolant system extends to and includes the outennost containment isolation valve in the main steam and 
1 feedwater piping. 
The entire RCPB is composed of leaktight components to ensure that all radioactivity is confined inside the boundary. 
1 The designation of NRC Quality Group A is exclusively reserved for components that are part of the RCPB; these must meet 
I the requirements for ASME Class 1 components as set forth in Section III of the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, 
except where specifically exempted by the provisions of 10 CFR 50.55a. 
I This chapter is devoted to a review of aging degradation of RCPB components. Individual sections address aging of PWR p ip  
ing, valves, and fittings; BWR piping, valves, and fittings; coolant pumps; steam generator tubes (PWR); and pressurizers 
(PWR). Aging degradation of BWR and PWR pressure vessels (including inlet and outlet nozzles) is reviewed in Chapter 2. 
PWR Piping, Valves, and Fittings 
This section addresses the aging degradation of carbon steel and SS components that comprise the PWR reactor coolant 
pressure boundary. The review covers piping, pipe fittings, and pressure-containing components of in-line and pressure relief 
valves, in the reactor coolant, chemical and volume control (CVC), residual heat removal/low-pressure safety injection 
(RHRILPSI), and high-pressure safety injection (HPSI) systems, and the safety injection tanklcore flood sub-system. The 
reactor coolant piping contains the high-pressure water that circulates through the reactor core to remove the heat generated by 
the fission process. The heated water exits from the reactor vessel and passes through the coolant loop piping to the steam 
generators. Here it gives up heat to the feedwater to generate steam for the turbine generator. The cycle is completed when 
the water is pumped by the reactor coolant pumps (RCPs) back to the reactor vessel. The nuclear steam supply system (NSSS) 
of a PWR plant consists of a reactor and 2, 3, or 4 closed coolant loops connected parallel to the reactor vessel, each loop 
containing 1 or 2 RCPs and a steam generator. The number of loops and the number of RCPs per loop is dependent on the 
specific plant and the NSSS vendor design. The layout for a typical two-loop CE plant is shown in Figure 4.1. The system is 
contained entirely within the containment building. The main reactor coolant piping in Westinghouse plants is primarily made 
of cast SS, while B&W uses carbon steel with welddeposited SS cladding, and CE uses carbon steel with roll-bonded SS 
cladding (Shah and MacDonald 1993, p. 150). 
The Chemical Volume Control System (CVCS) controls the volume, purity, and boric acid content of the reactor coolant. The 
CVCS also provides seal injection water for the reactor coolant pumps. A bypass stream of reactor coolant is continuously 
purified to control the purity of the reactor coolant and the boric acid concentration. The CVCS also supplies emergency 
boration. 
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Figure 4.1 Typical two-loop combustion engineering reactor coolant system (Cloud and Server 1987) 
The RHRILPSI system performs several functions during the various states of reactor operation. Its primary functions are to 
remove heat from the reactor core during normal shutdown and to provide injection cooling of the core during a loss-of-coolant 
accident (LOCA) and post-LOCA conditions. The RHRlLPSI system generally consists of two trains; however, one 
Westinghouse plant uses three trains. Each train of the two-train design has a 100% capacity and is redundant to the other 
train. The three-traindesigned plant requires two of the three trains to operate in order to accomplish its function. Each train 
consists of a pump and a heat exchanger with their associated valves. The pumps can be aligned to draw suction from the 
borated refueling water storage tank, the containment sump, or a hot leg (or legs) of the reactor coolant system. 
A diagram of the HPSI system is presented in Figure 4.2; the system is designed to operate during small LOCAs when reactor 
coolant pressure has not been significantly reduced from normal operating pressures. In this circumstance, the HPSI system 
injects borated water into the reactor coolant system to provide cooling to limit core damage and fission product release and to 
ensure an adequate shutdown margin. The HPSI system has two or three redundant trains, depending on the NSSS vendor. A 
typical train consists of a high-head pump that draws suction from the refueling water storage tank and discharges to the cold 
legs of the reactor coolant system. 
The safety injection tanWcore flood subsystem is a passive system that requires no external signal or power source to operate. 
It is designed to rapidly inject cooling water into the reactor vessel when vessel pressure is reduced by a LOCA; check valves 
prevent activation until pressure falls below a predetermined level, then nitrogen gas pressure provides the driving force for 
coolant injection. (The piping is connected to the cold legs or directly into the RPV depending on the NSSS vendor. Both 
Westinghouse and CE units have cold leg connections; in B&W units the connections are to the low pressure/core flood 
penetrations into the RPV.) 
4.1.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR coolant piping are summarized in Table 4.1. The primary mechanisms 
of concern are thermal embrittlement and fatigue. The reactor coolant piping, valves, and fittings of a number of plants use 
cast SSs. Although no problems have been reported, there have been two areas of concern for the long-term fracture integrity 
of cast SS components. These are 1) the subsmtial loss of fracture toughness caused by thermal aging of cast materials, and 
2) the difficulty of using ultrasonic methods to detect cracks in these materials because of their coarse grained microstructures. 
These factors lead to possible catastrophic fractures due to large flaws dating from either fabrication or from yet unknown 
forms of service degradation. Should these flaws go undetected for long periods of time, they could propagate and rupture the 
component if the fracture toughness eventually decreased to a critical level or if the stresses increased above normal levels 
during a severe accident event such as an earthquake. The thermal embrittlement degradation mechanism causes a loss in 
tensile ductility (decrease in residual elongation) and increases the DBTT when cast SS is aged at elevated temperatures. The 
consequence of this factor is a possible failure by brittle fracture (as opposed to ductile rupture) should the piping be subjected 
to thermal or mechanical shock when operating at a temperature below the DBTT. 
Welds generally have a lower initial fracture toughness than the base metal before thermal exposure due to the presence of 
inclusions or flaws. Generally, the failure is controlled more by the inclusions than by the aging mechanism. However it 
appears that there may be a synergistic interaction between the embrittled femte phase and inclusions in the shielded metal arc 
welds that could result in potential problems. 
Stress corrosion cracking, corrosion, and erosion/corrosion have not been, and are not expected to become, mechanisms of 
concern for the internal surfaces of components considered in this section (Shah and MacDonald 1993, pp. 172-173). How- 
ever, leakage of coolant onto hot external surfaces has resulted in boric acid corrosion; for susceptible material, it could also 
. result in external stress corrosion cracking. 
Piping systems in older plants were designed to the Power Piping Code, which did not specifically require fatigue usage eval- 
uation. Furthermore, on-line monitoring of cyclic loading on the piping was not implemented in many plants. Therefore the 
fatigue evaluations are either non-existent or inaccurate because of inadequate data. Cumulative fatigue usage evaluations per 
the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code require that usage factors be calculated for the maximum stress range and for 
progressively smaller stress ranges and then summed. The largest stress ranges are typically produced by combinations of 
pressure and thermal transient conditions occurring at different times in the operating history of the plant. Thus the accuracy 
of the resulting cumulative usage factors is a complex function of the accuracy of the operating history, including normal 
temperature and pressure cycles, vibratory loads, and stresses imposed by abnormal bccurrences (such as water hammer, 
stratified flow, and seismic events). The fatigue design criterion in the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code is intended to 
ensure that safety margins used to design and license the plants are maintained, and the breach of primary pressure boundary is 
not seriously compromised by fatigue. This criterion requires that the cumulative fatigue usage be below unity. An increase 
in the value of the cumulative usage factor to values over unity (due to long-term aging) would indicate the likelihood of initia- 
tion of fatigue cracks, which would then grow due to the cyclic loadings causing a fatigue failure. 
I 
Fmrn letdown storage tank 
Figure 4.2 Diagram of a PWR high pressure i~ec t i on  system (Blahnik et al. 1992) 
Table 4.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR CPB piping, valves, and fittings 
The original design of the RCPB piping has proven to be adequate to the extent that there have been no failures or reported 
occurrence of cracking that was attributed to fatigue of RCPB piping. However, this does not guarantee that fatigue damage 
will continue to be a non-problem for RCPB piping. In general, most of the actual transients including normal shutdowns and 
scrams result in significantly slower rates of temperature change than specxed in the original plant design basis for the RCPB 
piping. Therefore these transients do not contribute significantly to the overall fatigue damage. However, the fatigue damage 
in RCPB piping systems can be significantly increased by changes in loading conditions not anticipated in the design phase: 
flow- and equipment-induced vibrations, stratified flow conditions, and water or steam hammer events. In addition to produc- 
ing fatigue damage, severe water or steam hammer events have resulted in deformation and cracking of feedwater piping and 
pipe support structures. 
References' 
pp. 161 -1 72 
pp. 157-161 
Notice 86-108; 
Generic Letter 88- 
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pp. 157-161 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
ARing Mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement 
Thermal and mechanical 
fatigue 
Boric acid corrosion; 
Wear 
Stress relaxation; 
corrosion 
Stress corrosion cracking 
Fatigue 
Components 
Reactor Coolant, CVCS, 
RHRILPSI, and HPSl 
piping and valves 
Safety and relief valve 
flanges and bolts 
Bolts and nuts 
lntegral supports 
Materials 
Cast SS 
Shielded metal-arc welds in 
austenitic SS 
Carbon steel with austenitic 
SS cladding; Austenitic SS; 
Cast SS 
Steel 
Steel 
Steel 
Aging Concerns 
lncrease in ductile-to- 
brittle transition 
temperature 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Loss of support 
There have been several instances of corrosion of RCPB components where leakage of primary water resulted in the concen- 
tration of boric acid; some of these incidents were reviewed in Notice 86-108, and additional information was provided in 
Generic Letter 88-05. 
Instances of stress corrosion cracking of valve bolting were reviewed in Bulletin 89-02; more recently, SSC of power-operated 
relief valves has been reported (Notice 94-55). Similar problems have been reported in regard to bolting of reactor coolant 
pumps (see Section 4.3); in all cases, these degraded components were made of SSs that are very susceptible to stress 
corrosion cracking. 
4.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
A summary of options for managing aging degradation of PWR coolant piping is provided in Table 4.2. 
Accurate records, regarding the number, type, and severity of transients that cause fatigue damage, should be maintained and 
analyzed to estimate remaining fatigue life of the piping. Piping system design, operating procedures, and maintenance 
practices should be critically examined with the aim of reducing the number and severity of fatigue-producing transients. For 
example, piping layout should minimize the potential for water hammer or thermal stratification to occur; the causes of flow- 
induced and mechanical vibrations should be identified and corrected, if possible. Reliability-centered maintenance practices 
should be instituted to reduce the number and severity of thermal cycles associated with equipment-related shutdowns. 
The data needed to determine upto-date usage factors can in most cases be retrieved from the available records. Detailed data 
searches need to be completed for individual plants throughout their prior history in order to define the actual transient loading 
conditions which produce fatigue damage. Although the design Stress Report can potentially identify critical locations in terms 
of fatigue usages, the calculation of stress ranges for the purpose of updating usages should incorporate changes in the transient 
conditions and differences in the mechanical constraints in the system in relation to the original design. 
Table 4.2 Managing aging degradation of PWR CPB piping, valves, and fittings 
Components 
Reactor Coolant, 
CVCS, RHRILPSI, 
and HPSI piping and 
valves 
Safety and relief 
valve flanges and 
bolts 
Bolts and nuts 
Integral supports 
References 
ASME Section 
XI, Subsection 
IWB and Table 
IWB-2m- 1 
ASME Section 
XI, Subsection 
IWB and Table 
IWB-2500- 1 
Materials 
Cast SS 
Shielded metal-arc welds in 
austenitic SS 
Carbon steel with austenitic SS 
cladding; Austenitic SS; Cast 
SS 
Steel 
Steel 
Steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement 
Thermal and mechanical 
fatigue 
Boric acid corrosion 
Wear 
Stress relaxation; 
corrosion; Stress corrosion 
cracking 
Fatigue 
Management Options 
Analysis of plant operating 
records; metallurgical 
examinations 
Ultrasonic examination; 
dadiographic examination 
Visual examination; Ultrasonic 
examination; Repair; 
Replacement 
Visual examination; Ultrasonic 
examination, Replacement 
Analysis o f  plant operating 
records 
4.2 BWR Piping, Valves, and Fittings 
This section addresses aging degradation of carbon steel and SS components that comprise the RCPB of BWRs. The review 
covers piping, pipe fittings, and pressure-containing components of in-line and pressure relief valves in the recirculation, main 
steam (MS), feedwater, reactor core isolation cooling (RCIC), residual heat removalllow-pressure coolant injection 
(RHRILPCI), high-pressure coolant injection (HPCI), high-pressure core spray (IIPCS), and low-pressure core spray (LPCS) 
systems. Aging degradation of pressure vessels and the pressure-containing components of the recu~ulation pumps, which are 
also part of the RCPB, is addressed in Chapter 2 and Section 4.3, respectively. 
The BWR recirculation system pumps reactor coolant through the core. This is accomplished by two recirculation loops that 
are external to the reactor vessel but inside the containment. A constant flow rate is maintained by either variable speed 
pumps (BWR-3 and BWR4 designs) or a flow control valve (BWR-5 and BWR-6 designs). A typical recirculation loop (in 
newer BWRs) contains four motor-operated valves (MOVs) and one hydraulically operated valve, a recirculation pump, and 
twelve jet pumps (Big Rock Point, Nine Mile Point-1, and Oyster Creek-1 do not have jet pumps). The jet pumps are not part 
of the RCPB but are addressed in Section 3.2. 
A simplified schematic of a typical BWR main steam system is presented in Figure 4.3. The MS system transports steam from 
the RPV to the turbine generator. Depending on the design, two to four steam l i e s  may be used. 
The pressure-containing components of the MS system up to the main steam isolation valves (MSIV) are part of the RCPB; 
these include the MS lines, the pressure relief valves, and the MSIVs, which are usually pneumatically actuated. 
The condensate from the turbines is returned to the RPV by the feedwater system, forming a closed loop during normal opera- 
tion. Each feedwater line contains two check valves that provide containment isolation and are part of the RCPB. The RCIC 
system provides makeup water to the RPV during shutdown and when the vessel is isolated from the main condenser. The 
RCIC system's primary source of water is the condensate storage tank. The secondary source is the suppression pool. Valves 
may also be aligned to provide water from the RHRILPCI system. A steam turbinedriven pump draws suction from these 
three sources and discharges through a shutoff valve into the RPV. Steam to operate the turbine is generated in the RPV by 
decay heat in the reactor core. The RHRILPCI, HPCI, HPCS, and LPCS are emergency core cooling systems that are 
designed to mitigate the consequences of postulated emergency situations that could result in core damage and the release of 
fission products to the environment. 
The RHRILPCI system performs several functions during the various states of reactor operation. Its primary function is to 
remove heat from the reactor core during normal shutdown (shutdown cooling mode), LOCA, and post-LOCA conditions 
(coolant injection mode). The flow paths for these two modes of operation are shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. The RHRILPCI 
system may also assist in containment heat removal and containment spray operations. 
The BWR-1 through BWR-5 designs use a HPCI system to maintain coolant inventory when the pressure is above that at 
which the RHRILPCI or LPCS systems can operate. Water from the condensate storage tank or the suppression pool is 
pumped through a series of check valves into the feedwater line to the RPV. 
In the BWR-6 design, a HPCS system replaces the HPCI system of the older designs. Makeup water is discharged through 
spray nozzles onto the reactor core, rather than through the feedwater l i es .  
The function of the LPCS system is to help prevent fuel damage in the event a LOCA occurs that might uncover the reactor 
core. The system contains a single independent pump that draws suction from the suppression pool and discharges through a 
series of check valves into the low-pressure spray sparger over the reactor core. 
Because of the number of different BWR product lines and variations betwken plants, this discussion does not describe all the 
features of each plant. In general, all the equivalent systems described above are included in the aging management of BWRs. 
For instance, the BWR-2 design incorporated the Emergency Feedwater and Core Spray systems. The BWR-3 design added 
LPCI. Each generation added or replaced systems that perform the ECCS functions. The equivalent piping/valves/fittings are 
to be considered for management of aging. All of the functions of the RHR system including Shutdown Cooling and 
Containment Spray, whether a part of RHR or not, should be subject to a comprehensive aging management program. 
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Figure 4.3 Simplified schematic of BWR main steam system (Ware et al. 1989) 
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Figure 4.5 Flow path during operation of RHR system in coolant iqjection mode (Lofaro et al. 1989) 
4.2.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for BWR RCPB piping, valves, and fittings are summarized in Table 4.3. All 
piping and pipe fittings are either carbon steel or austenitic SS; cast pipe or pipe fittings were not used in BWR RCPB systems. 
Wall thinning due to erosion-corrosion has been a major problem for carbon steel pipe in the MS and feedwater systems 
(Notice 92-35, Notice 93-21). A small section of feedwater piping in LaSalle Unit 1 also developed leaks due to localized 
erosion; however, this occurrence was due to a design deficiency and should not be of concern at other plants. 
Carbon steel piping is also susceptible to degradation from fatigue, primarily due to thennal stratification and flow-induced 
vibrations. In particular, thermal stratification resulted in several instances of fatigue cracks developing in feedwater piping; 
the history of these incidents is outlined in Notice 91-38. Thermal fatigue has also resulted in cracking of cast steel valve 
bodies (Notice 92-50). 
Intergranular stress corrosion cracking (IGSCC) of wrought austenitic SS has been a recurring problem for BWRs (Bulletin 83- 
02). Changes in water chemistry, thermal and mechanical treatments to eliminate tensile stress at sensitized surfaces, and 
replacement of BWR piping with steels that are less susceptible to IGSCC, as recommended by Hazelton and Koo (1988), have 
eliminated most of the concern. However, the potential still exists for IGSCC to occur under some circumstances, and there is 
some question as to whether the rate of orack growth is independent of the incubation period. 
Transgranular stress corrosion cracking (TGSCC) has not yet been a problem for operating plants; however, laboratory results 
show that it can be initiated by coolant impurities, and once started, the cracks continue to grow, even in Type 316NG. 
Therefore, maintaining high water purity is a good preventive practice. 
Thermal err~brittlement or IGSCC has not caused problems for cast SS valve bodies used in BWR RCPB systems. However, 
the local femte content can vary over a large range (Bogie et al. 1992) that includes the potential for localized regions with 
increased ferrite content to undergo an increase in the ductile-to-brittle transition temperature, while other regions with 
decreased femte content develop IGSCC (Lapides 1991). 
Table 4.3 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for BWR CPB piping, valves, and fittings 
Leakage due to wear, of valve flanges or stress relaxation in nuts and bolts can result in leakage of the primary reactor coolant; 
if molybdenum disulfide is present as a lubricant, hydrogen sulfide can be produced and result in stress corrosion cracking of 
the bolting. 
4.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
I 
The options for managing aging degradation of BWR coolant piping are summarized in Table 4.4. Shah and MacDonald 
(1993) have extensively reviewed the options (countermeasures) for managing aging degradation due to IGSCC in BWR RCPB 
piping. These options include materials-related remedies, such as solution heat treating and application of a corrosion-resistant 
coating (which can be done in the field); various stress-related remedies that reduce the tensile stresses in the HAZs of welds; 
the application of hydrogen water chemistry to reduce the electrochemical potential that drives IGSCC; temporary repair 
actions; and replacement of degraded piping. Hazelton and Koo (1988) provide the technical basis for NRC guidance and 
recommendations for controlling IGSCC, detecting and evaluating pipe cracks, repair methods, and replacement of 
deteriorated piping. The NRC position is formally set forth in Generic Letter 88-01. 
References' 
p. 680; Notice 92-35; Notice 
93-21 
pp. 805-81 1 ; Notice 91 -38; 
Notice 92-50 
Components 
MS and FW pipe and in- 
line valves 
MS. FW, RCIC. 
RHRILPCI, HPCI, HPCS, 
Accurate records, regarding the number, type, and severity of transients that cause fatigue damage, should be maintained and 
analyzed to estimate the remaining fatigue Life of the piping. Piping system design, operating procedures, and maintenance 
practices should be critically examined with the aim of reducing the number and severity of fatigueproducing transients. For 
example, piping layout should minimize the potential for water hammer or thermal stratification to occur; the causes of flow- 
induced and mechanical vibrations should be identified and corrected, if possible; and reliability-centered maintenance 
practices can reduce the number and severity of thermal cycles associated with equipment-related shutdowns. 
pp. 679-680; Bulletin 83-02 
p. 680 
pp. 805-81 1 
pp. 680-681 
-- 
and LPCS pipe and in-line 
valves 
Recirculation; RHRILPCI, 
HPCS, and LPCS pipe and 
valves 
Recirculation, RHRILPCI. 
HPCS, and LPCS valves 
Valve flanges 
Nuts and bolts 
Integral supports 
Materials 
Carhon 
steel 
Carbon 
steel 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Austenitic 
SS; Cast SS 
valves 
Cast SS 
Steel 
Carbon 
steel 
Steel 
Aging Concerns 
Wall thinning 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Aging Mechilnisms 
Erosion-corrosion 
Fatigue due to thermal 
transients, vibration, and 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Crack tnitiation and 
growth 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Increase in ductile-to- 
brittle transition 
temperature 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
pressure 
Intergranular stress corrosion 
cracking 
Transgranular stress 
corrosion cracking 
Thermal fatigue 
Thermal embrittlement 
Wear 
Stress relaxation 
Thermal and mechanical 
fatigue 
Table 4.4 Managing aging degradation in BWR CPB piping, valves, and fittings 
The data needed to determine upto-date usage factors c y ,  in most cases, be retrieved from the available records. Detailed 
data searches need to be completed for individual plants throughout their prior history in order to define the actual transient 
loading conditions which produce fatigue damage. Although the design Stress Report can potentially identify critical locations 
in terms of fatigue usage, the calculation of stress ranges for the purpose of updating fatigue usage should incorporate changes 
in the transient conditions and differences in the mechanical constraints in the system in relation to the original design. 
Replacement of carbon steel piping components with low alloy or low carbon grade austenitic SS has been used successfully to- 
mitigate erosion-corrosion. 
Components 
MS and feedwater pipe 
MS and feedwater in-line 
valves 
MS. Feedwater. RCIC, 
RHRILPCI, HPCI, HPCS, 
and LPCS pipe and in-line 
valves 
Recirculation, RHRILPCI, 
HPCS, and LPCS pipe and 
valves 
Recirculation, RHRILPCI, 
HPCS, and LPCS valves 
Valve flanges 
Nuts and bolts 
Integral supports 
The initiation of TGSCC can be prevented by the application of hydrogen water chemistry and the strict control of impurities. 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
bUltrasonic not effective for cast SS valves. 
Management Options 
Ultrasonic examinations; 
Radiography 
Visual examination 
Analysis of records of transients; 
Minimize transients; Ultrasonic 
examinations 
Materials-related remedies; 
Stress-related remedies; 
Hydrogen water chemistry; 
Temporary repairs; 
Replacement; Ultrasonic 
examination*' 
Hydrogen water chemistry; 
impurity control; Ultrasonic 
examination 
Analysis of plant operating 
records 
Analysis of plant operating 
records; Test specimens 
Visual examination; Repair; 
Replacement 
Visual examination; Ultrasonic 
examination; Replacement 
Analysis of plant operating 
records 
The effects of thermal embrittlement and IGSCC on cast SS components can be predicted if plant operating records have been 
maintained in sufficient detail; Chopra (1994) reviewed the fracture properties of thermally-aged cast SSs and derived correla- 
tions that can be used to predict Charpy-impact energy and fracture toughness from known material information, time, and 
References' 
pp. 815-818; 
Wu 1989, Appendix 
A 
ASME Section XI 
pp. 815-81 8 
pp. 691-712; 
Hazelton and Koo 
1988; Generic Letter 
88-01 
pp. 714-715 
pp. 680-68 1 
ASME Section XI, 
Table IWB-2500- 1 
Materials 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Austenitic SS; 
Cast SS valves 
Cast SS 
Steel 
Carbon steel 
Steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
Erosion-corrosion 
Erosion-corrosion 
Fat~gue due to thermal 
transients, vibration, and 
pressure 
Intergranular stress corrosion 
cracking 
Transgranular stress corrosion 
cracking 
Thermal fatigue 
Thermal embrittlement 
Wear 
Stress relaxation 
Thermal and mechanical 
fatigue 
service temperature. Chopra and Shack (1994) present the correlations and procedures recommended by Chopra (1994) in a 
concise, easy-to-use form. Examination of test specimens from cast SS components (such as valve bodies and piping elbows) 
can be used to confirm predictions. 
4.3 Reactor Coolant Pumps 
The RCPs circulate the primary coolant water through the reactor coolant system. All of the pumps are of the single stage, 
single suction, centrifugal design, with the motor mounted above the pump. The three general types of coolant pumps are 
illustrated in Figures 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8. All BWR recirculation pumps are known as Type C, while PWR primary coolant 
pumps are either Type E or Type F. The major design difference is that Type F pumps have thicker walls than Types C or E; 
additional detail on pump design is given in Chapter 10 of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
In general, CE plants use Type E pumps, Westinghouse plants use Westinghouse-manufactured Type F pumps, while B&W 
plants may use either Type E or Type F pumps: Drahos et al. (1989) provide a comprehensive listing of the type of pump used 
in each nuclear plant in the United States. Subcomponents that are part of the RCPB are the pump casing, cover, nozzles, seal 
flange, seal-cooling heat exchanger, and the closure studs and nuts. 
Type F pump casings have high residual stresses at the welds and low stresses in the base metal; Types C and E have high 
residual stresses in both the welds and in the base metal. There is a potential for cracks to develop at the interior surface of 
the pump body under the combined effects of residual stresses and fatigue; however, design of the pump bodies is generally 
considered to be very conservative from a fatigue standpoint. 
4.3.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
The aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for those components of the RCPs that are part of the RCPB are summarized 
in Table 4.5. 
The casings and covers of RCPs are fabricated from either static-cast SS or carbon steel that is internally clad with SS. Cast 
SS pump sections are joined by welding with femtecontrolled filler material. Cast austenitic-femtic (duplex) SS loses 
ductility (becomes more brittle), but also gains strength, when aged at elevated temperatures. The mechanism that produces 
these changes, which occurs slowly at normal LWR coolant temperatures, is referred to as thermal embrittlement. Thermal 
embrittlement results in an increase in the DBTT of duplex SSs. The primary concern is that, if the pump casing is subjected 
to a thennal or mechanical shock when it is operating at a temperature below the DBTT, it may fail by brittle fracture, instead 
of yielding in a ductile mode. 
Cast SS pump casings are susceptible to IGSCC in BWRs if the femte content is low. The local ferrite content can vary over 
a large range (Bogie et al. 1992); thus, it is possible that localized regions may be deficient in femte content. Indeed, Lapides 
(1991) reported the occurrence of localized IGSCC under normal BWR conditions. Type C pump casings receive a full 
solution anneal; this heat treatment reduces sensitization of heat-affected zones near the welds. However, if repair welding is 
later performed, the weld zones may also be susceptible to IGSCC. 
Closure studs bolt the coolant pump cover to the casing. In PWRs, if the gasket leaks, the reactor coolant can cause boric acid 
corrosion of the closure studs, which are made of low-alloy steel; there have also been instances where this leakage has 
resulted in stress corrosion cracking of bolts that were fabricated of Alloy A-286, an alloy that is particularly susceptible to 
stress corrosion cracking (Notice 90-68). 
Coolant pump internals are susceptible to high-cycle mechanical and thermal fatigue. Failure of the pump internals will not 
compromise the integrity of the pressure boundary, but broken pieces could be camed into the RPV and cause damage to the 
reactor internals. 
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Figure 4.6 BWR Type C reactor coolant pump Figure 4.7 PWR Type E reactor coolant pump 
(Jaske and Shah 1990) (Jaske and Shah 1990) 
Figure 4.8 PWR Type F reactor coolant pump 
(Jaske and Shah 1990) 
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Table 4.5 Aging degradation concerns a n d  mechanisms f o r  reactor  coolant pumps  
4.3.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Options for managing aging degradation of RCPs are  summarized in Table 4.6. 
Table 4.6 Managing aging degradation of reactor coolant pumps 
Components 
Pump casing; 
Cover 
Heat exchanger 
Seal flange 
Closure studs and 
nuts 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and ~ a c ~ o n a l d  (1993). 
Aging Concerns 
Increase in ductde-to-brittle transition 
temperature 
Craclung at positions having high 
residual stress (Types C and E pump 
casings) 
Crack initiation and growth in Type C 
(BWR) pump casings 
Wastage (PWR only) 
Craclung at positions having h g h  
residual stress (Types C and E pump 
casings) 
Leakage 
Leakage 
Bolting failure 
Materials 
Cast SS 
Cast SS: 
Carbon steel 
with SS 
cladding 
Steel 
Steel 
Low-alloy 
steel 
Components 
Pump casing; 
Cover 
Heat 
exchanger 
Seal flange 
Closure studs 
and nuts 
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement 
Thermal and mechanical 
fatigue 
Intergranular stress corrosion 
cracking 
Boric acid corrosion 
Thermal fatigue 
Wear 
Stress relaxation 
Boric acid corrosion (PWR 
pumps only); Stress corrosion 
cracking 
Materials 
Cast SS 
Cast SS; 
Carbon steel 
with SS 
cladding 
Steel 
Steel 
Low-alloy 
steel 
Reference 
ss 
pp. 355- 
3 5 6  
pp. 356- 
3 6 0  
pp. 360- 
361  
p. 3 6 0  
-- 
p. 360;  
Notice 90- 
6 8  
Aging Mechanisms 
Thermal embrittlement 
Fatigue 
Intergranular stress corrosion 
cracking 
Boric acid corrosion 
Thermal fatigue 
Wear 
Stress relaxation 
(PWR) Boric acid corrosion; 
SCC 
Management Options 
Visual examination 
Visual examination; 
Repair 
Visual examination; 
Ultrasonic examination; 
Replacement 
References 
Shah and MacDonald 1993, pp. 362- 
365; 
Guy 1990; 
ASME Section XI, Table IWB-2500-1 
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Conventional ultrasonic inspection techniques are not capable of reliably detecting cracks in the pump bodies and internals 
because of the large grain size and the elastic anisotropy caused by different grain structures in the casings. Likewise, current 
radiographic techniques have not proven reliable for detecting cracks in the casing welds, and vibration monitoring techniques 
have not been capable of detecting high-cycle fatigue cracks early enough to avoid unscheduled outages. Thus, visual 
examination of exterior and interior surfaces during routinely scheduled inspections remains the most reliable method for 
detecting cracks in these components. Chopra and Shack (1994) present the correlations and procedures recommended by 
Chopra (1994) in a concise, easy-to-use form. Egan et al. (1987) reviewed inservice inspection techniques, and Jeong and 
Amrnirato (1988) reviewed the use of ultrasonic techniques for the examination of welds in cast SS pump bodies. 
Closure studs can be visually inspected; however, the ultrasonic cylindrically guided wave technique is capable of reliably 
detecting (but not sizing) both corrosion wastage and flaws that are well below the critical crack size (Light et al. 1986; Liu 
1 993). 
4.4 Steam Generator (PWR) 
This section addresses the aging degradation of Alloy 600 tubes in PWR steam generators. 
In PWRs, the hot primary coolant water is circulated through the steam generator tubes and heats the secondary-system water 
to make steam that drives the turbine generators. The two types of steam generators in use for PWR plants are illustrated in 
Figures 4.9 and 4.10. Westinghouse and CE plants use recirculating steam generators (RSG), which generally convert about 
25% of the secondary water to steam during each pass through the generators; the remainder of the water is recirculated. 
Babcox and Wilcox plants use once-through steam generators (OTSG) from which only steam exits on the secondary side. 
The design of the steam generators confiies radionuclides from neutron activation or damaged fuel within the RCPB during 
normal operation. However, if a tube leaks the flow is from the primary side to the secondary side, and rupture of a tube 
could cause the release of radioactivity to the environment. Moreover, the sudden failure of several tubes could result in 
depressurization of the RCPB. 
Except for recently manufactured steam generators, all tubing was made from nickel-based Alloy 600. However, as discussed 
by Shah and MacDonald (1993, pp. 252-255), differences in processing details and manufacturing methodologies that were 
employed by the different manufacturers (and even by the same manufacturer at different periods) can significantly affect the 
response of the material to a given environment. Moreover, the fact that some of these differences may still be held as trade 
secrets complicates the task of generalizing variables that are of universal importance to an understanding of the material's 
behavior. 
4.4.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
The aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR steam generator tubes are summarized in Table 4.7. 
Primary water stress corrosion cracking (PWSCC) has been observed only in Westinghouse RSGs. However, most of the 
affected steam generator tubes had been given a relatively low-temperature mill-anneal; tubing used in CE and B&W steam 
generators was given a higher-temperature mill-anneal, which makes them more resistant to PWSCC; however, PWSCC may 
become of increasing importance as the plants continue to age. Stress corrosion cracking also occurred on the primary side of 
OTSGs in Three Mile Island, Unit 1; however, this is believed to have been caused by contamination of the primary-side water 
(Shah and MacDonald 1993, pp. 288-289). There are two principal types of intergranular corrosion that occur on the 
secondary-water side of PWR steam generators: intergranular attack (IGA) and IGSCC. Both high-temperature and low- 
temperature mill-annealed tubes have been affected by these mechanisms; however, to date, IGA and IGSCC have not been a 
problem for thermally treated tubes. 
Denting is the plastic deformation of tubes resulting from the buildup of carbon steel support plate corrosion products 
(magnetite) in tube-to-tube support plate annuli. The buildup of nonprotective corrosion product oxides, consisting mainly of 
iron oxide (magnetite), leads directly to tube distortion at the support plate intersections and to distortion and cracking of the 
support plates. The tube distortions at the support plate intersections have resulted in numerous instances of tube leaks caused 
by stress corrosion cracks initiated primarily from the inside (primary side) surface of the dented tube. 
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Figure 4.9 Schematic of recirculating steam generator with problem areas indicated (Malhotra 1987) 
Unlike most degradation mechanisms, denting usually affects large numbers of tubes at approximately the same time. The 
buildup and expansion of corrosion products occurs over an extended period of time, but deformation of the tubes occurs in a 
short period of time. The primary concern is that even small dents can induce large tensile stresses in the tubes and initiate 
IGSCC or PWSCC during subsequent operation. 
Pitting is another steam generator tube aging mechanism. Once initiated, pitting can rapidly spread and result in through-wall 
penetration within a few operating cycles, resulting in transfer of radionuclides to the secondary-water system. This is not, 
however, considered a significant safety hazard because leakage is detected long before catastrophic failure could occur. 
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Figure 4.10 Schematic of once-through steam generator with problem areas indicated (Malhotra 1987) 
Fretting has caused operational problems for many plants with RSGs. The fretting (wear) is caused by mechanical vibration, 
and results in thinning of tube walls where they contact parts of the support structure. There are concerns that vibration and 
wear will result in the initiation and growth of fatigue cracks; however, there have been no fretting-fatigue failures to date. 
Only a few incidents of fretting and wear have occurred with B&W OTSG tubes, and the mechanism is not considered to be of 
serious concern for OTSGs. 
Several PWRs have experienced reactor coolant system leakage due to cracked (and failed) steam generator primary manway 
stud bolts. The failure of these low alloy steel bolts has been attributed to accelerated stress corrosion cracking. The cracks 
occur when boric acid andlor lithium hydroxide leaks past the manway gasket and interacts with the studs' molybdenum 
disulfide lubricant. At Maine Yankee, five of twenty primary manway studs were found to be cracked. Six other studs had 
Table 4.7 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for the steam generator tubes 
- 
Primary side of steam 
Secondary side of steam 
Leakage through tube 
walls; Reduction in fatigue 
Secondary side of OTSG 
completely failed. At another facility, two bolts failed while being detensioned, .and a third was found to have a crack 
extending through about 90% of its diameter. 
High-cycle fatigue has caused tube ruptures in RSGs at two plants. Such ruptures are serious because of the challenge to 
safety systems and the release of radioisotopes from the RCPB. However, high-cycle fatigue does not appear to be a general 
problem for PWR steam generators. 
Erosion-corrosion has been a minor problem for a few plants with OTSGs, but the tubewall thinning has been localized and 
has not lead to tube rupture. Likewise, corrosion fatigue has occurred only at a few plants having OTSGs. Therefore, neither 
mechanism is considered to be of serious concern. 
Wastage was a problem for RSGs of plants that used phosphate water chemistry control. This method is no longer in use at 
nuclear plants in the United States; thus, wastage is not currently an issue of concern. One other potential concern is corrosion 
or fatigue cracking of welds in the steam generator shell. 
4.4.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Options for managing aging degradation of PWR steam generator tubes are summarized in Table 4.8. EPRI has funded the 
development of techniques for inservice inspection of steam generator tubing (Thompson and Elsley 1983). 
Various techniques are available for reducing stresses on the interior (primary side) of steam generator tubes; these techniques, 
which include shot peening, retropeening, stress relieving by thennal treatment, and reducing the hot-leg temperature, may 
significantly delay the onset of PWSCC. Plugging, sleeving, or replacing the affected tubes are the only effective repair 
methods. Lowenstein et al. (1991) have reviewed life assessment procedures for the steam generator tubes. 
Control of secondary water chemistry is the first line of defense against aging degradation of steam generator tubing. Extend- 
ing the life of steam generators involves stringent controls on impurities (primarily chloride, iron, and copper ions) and oxygen 
in the secondary-side water and preventing buildup of sludge. Loss of control of water chemistry can result in sig
nifi
cant 
degradation in a short period of time. Condenser leakages, resin releases from condensate polishers, and the intro duction of 
chlorine-containing inorganics through makeupwater sources have been major contributors to the loss of water chemistry 
Table 4.8 Managing aging degradation of PWR steam generator tubes 
Degradation Sites 
Primary side of steam generator tubes 
I I I 
Aging Mechankms 
Secondary side of steam generator tubes 
Primary water stress 
corrosion cracking; Denting 
Denting 
Management Options 
Intergranular corrosion 
Cleaning; Inservice inspection 
Pitting 
References' 
Control of water chemistry; Various measures to 
reduce stresses; Inservice inspection 
Control of water chemistry; Elimination of I pp. 311-315; b copper-bearing alloys; Chemical additives; 
I 
U-bend regions of RSG tubes 
I Corrosion fat~gue 
pp. 315-316; b 
I 
Secondary side of OTSG tubes 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
b ~ S M E  Section XI, Table IWB-25004, Category B-Q. 
Frettine 
High-cycle fatigue 
control. It has been demonstrated that certain chemical additives (e.g., boric acid and morpholine) will reduce IGA, stress 
corrosion cracking, and denting of tubes. Effects of these additives on other plant components are not well known. The guide- 
lines established by EPRl (Wood 1990), for continuous monitoring and control of water chemistry, should be followed to 
reduce impurities in the secondary water. 
Erosion-corrosion 
Denting, fretting wear, and erosion-corrosion of the tubes are generally detectable during normal inservice inspection, before 
leakage occurs. Localized pitting and cracking (due to fretting-fatigue, stress corrosion, and some forms of intergranular 
attack) are more difficult to detect before leaks develop. Behravesh (1992) sets forth excellent guidelines and recom- 
mendations for insewice examinations of steam generators. 
Options are dependent on design; Inservice 
inspection 
Plant specific; Inservice inspection I p. 287; b 
The root causes of fretting are dependent on specific design features of the steam generators; consequently, the most effective 
management options are also design dependent. In most cases, degradation appears to be limited to a specific region (for a 
specific design), and plugging of the affected tubes may be an effective remedy. 
pp. 281-286; b 
Occurrences of erosion-corrosion and corrosion fatigue have been limited to a few OTSGs, and management options appear to 
be plant specific. 
Replacement of existing steam generators with those built of more corrosion resistant alloys (such as Alloy 690) is becoming a 
viable alternative to avoid increasing maintenance costs, outages, or deratings. Over 38 steam generators at thirteen nuclear 
plants have been replaced. Replacement times have progressively gotten shorter with improved methods and experience. 
Replacement s t em generators are expected to have a longer life because of improved designs and materials. The design 
improvements include elimination of crevices, lower residual stresses, and improved access for secondary-side lancing and 
chemical cleaning. The improved materials include thermally treated Alloy 600, mill-annealed Alloy 690, and thermally 
treated Alloy 690 for the tubes and femtic SS for the tubesupport structures. 
4.5 Pressurizer (PWR) 
This section addresses aging degradation of the PWR pressurizer, including the associated surge and spray lines, nozzles, safe- 
ends, and spray heads. A simplified schematic of a pressurizer and the associated piping and valves is presented in Figure 
4.11. The primary purpose of the pressurizer is to control the reactor coolant pressure and prevent steam generation in any 
other part of the PWR RCPB. The pressurizer is connected to the piping between the RFW outlet and the steam generator inlet 
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Figure 4.11 Simplified schematic of a pressurizer system (Siege1 and Bak. 1989) 
(hot leg). Pressure is controlled by altering the saturation temperature and pressure of the steam and water inside the 
pressurizer. Condensing the steam volume by spraying cooler water into it has the net effect of reducing system pressure. 
Increasing the steam temperature by using electric heaters to heat the water volume has the effect of increasing system 
pressure. A system of pressure relief valves is provided to prevent over pressurizing the reactor coolant system. 
4.5.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
The aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for the PWR pressurizers and associated components are summarized in 
Table 4.9. 
The primary concerns regarding the pressurizer vessel are low-cycle fatigue due to plant operational, thermal, and pressure 
transients and high-cycle thermal fatigue caused by rapid temperature changes. The rapid changes are caused by the irnpinge- 
ment of spray on the pressurizer walls, movement of the liquid at the steam-water interface, and water level changes caused by 
insurges, outsurges, and heater actuation. Cracking through the cladding can expose the base metal (low-alloy or carbon steel) 
to corrosion. 
Surge and spray piping can be subjected to flow stratification which results in a severe circumferential temperature gradient 
leading to high thermal stresses. This causes significant fatigue damage and plastic deformation pulletin 88-11). The 
interface between the hot and cold layer also oscillates, leading to high cycle fatigue in surge and spray piping and nonles. 
Stress corrosion cracking and wear of pressurizer heater sheaths and sleeves has caused leaking of the primary coolant and 
loss or reduction of the spray pattern. Leaking of primary coolant can lead to stress corrosion cracking of manway bolts and 
corrosion of low-alloy steel in nearby components. 
Leaking through the gaskets under the manhole covers subjects the bolts to a corrosive environment. 
PNL-10717 PT. 1 
Table 4.9 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR pressurizers 
4.5.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
- 
The methods for managing aging degradation of PWR pressurizers are summarized in Table 4.10. 
Analysis of fatigue life at critical locations should be performed, if adequate records have been maintained. Inservice 
inspection, using ultrasonic and visual techniques, is critical to ensuring that degradation of the pressurizer vessel will not limit 
the economic life of the plant. 
Components 
Pressurizer vessel 
Surge and spray lines; 
Nozzles 
Spray head 
Heater sheaths; 
Instrument 
penetrations 
Manway bolts 
Leakage of coolant through heater sheaths, instrument penetrations, or manway cover gaskets should be controlled as it can 
result in corrosion and SCC of other components of the pressurizer system. 
Molybdenum disulfide lubricant should be avoided in any location where it could be exposed to steam. 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Materials 
Low-alloy or carbon steel 
with austenibc or 
Alloy 600 cladding: 
Cast SS 
SS; SS clad carbon- or 
low-alloy steel: Cast SS 
Forged or cast SS; 
AUoy 600 
SS; Alloy 600 
Low-alloy steel 
Aging Concerns 
Loss of material 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Crack initiation and ' 
growth 
Loss of spray capability 
Leakage 
Bolt breakage; Leakage 
Aging Mechanisms 
Boric acid corrosion 
Fatigue; Stress corrosion 
craclung 
Fatigue, possibly 
corrosion assisted 
Erosion, Thermal 
embrittlement, Fatigue 
Intergranular stress 
corrosion cracking, Boric 
acid corrosion 
Stress corrosion cracking; 
Stress relaxation 
Refecences 
-- 
pp. 390-393 
pp. 390-393 
pp. 399-400 
pp. 393- 
397: Notice 
90- 10 
pp. 397-399 
Table 4.10 Managing aging degradation of PWR pressurizers 
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5 Seismic Category I Structures 
Seismic Category I Structures house components, systems, and equipment that are relied on for safe operation and control of a 
nuclear power plant. The functions of Seismic Category I structures include ensuring the integrity of the RCPB, the capability 
to shut down the reactor and maintain it in a safe shutdown condition, and preventing or mitigating the consequences of 
accidents that could result in potential off-site exposure to radioactive materials. Other functions include the ability to 
withstand the effects of extreme environmental conditions and natural phenomena (hurricanes, floods, and seismic events) 
without loss of capability to protect equipment and systems. 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2 address aging and aging management of PWR and BWR containments. The primary functions of contain- 
ments are to house the NSSS, provide a barrier to atmospheric release of fission products that could be liberated from the 
primary coolant system during an accident; protect the reactor system from extreme environmental loads such as earthquakes, 
tornadoes, external explosions, and penetration by moving objects; and withstand design-basis earthquakes and pressures and 
temperatures associated with LOCA. Section 5.3 addresses the management of aging for other Seismic Category I structures. 
5.1 PWR Containment Structures 
This section addresses PWR containment structures for concrete (prestressed or reinforced) and freestanding steel designs. 
PWR containment structures provide a containment pressure boundary and leaktight barrier to radioactive release, and must be 
relatively large and strong to accommodate steam expansion from a primary coolant break. 
The major components of the PWR containment structure comprise the following categories: the primary containment struc- 
ture (which provides containment pressure boundary) constructed either of freestanding steel, prestressed concrete or 
reinforced concrete, with the concrete containments lined with steel to provide a leaktight barrier to radioactive release; base- 
mats constructed of reinforced concrete that is lined with steel (which form the load bearing portion of the containment pres- 
sure boundary) for concrete containments and cylindrical steel containments with flat bottoms; and penetrations through the 
containments (which form part of the pressure boundary). 
5.1.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Most PWR containments are constructed of prestressed concrete, a smaller number are of reinforced concrete, and a few are 
freestanding cylindrical steel structures housed in a reinforced concrete building (Figures 5.1, 5.2, and 5.3). These materials 
have been susceptible to internal and external environmental stressors, such as moisture, elevated temperature, freeze-thaw 
cycles, and cyclic loads (Shah and McDonald 1993, pp. 112-1 15). Aging degradation concerns considered to be significant for 
PWR reinforced concrete containment structures are 1) loss of strength and modulus due to elevated temperature, 2) scaling, 
cracking, and spalliig due to freezethaw cycles, and 3) increase of porosity and permeability, cracking, and spalling due to 
leaching of calcium hydroxide, attack by aggressive chemicals, and reaction with aggregates. Aging degradation concerns 
considered to be significant for PWR steel containment structures and components are 1) cracking, s p a h g ,  loss of bond, and 
loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel, prestressing tendons, structural steel, and liners and 2) reduction in design 
margin due to loss of prestress in prestressing tendons. 
Aging degradation of penetration assemblies is common to both BWR and PWR containments. A significant number of 
manufacturers have produced cable connections and penetration assemblies, resulting in many different construction methods 
and aging concerns. Significant aging degradation concerns and their mechanisms are summarized in Table 5.1. 
114-in. liner plate 
Secondary shielding 
and pressure boundary 
7-3054 
Figure 5.1 PWR prestressed concrete containment Type III @aye 1987) 
Secondary shielding 
and pressure boundary 
7-3076 
Figure 5.2 PWR reinforced concrete containment @aye 1987) 
Figure 5.3 PWR cylindrical steel containment enclosed in a reinforced concrete reactor building-(Shah et al. 1994) 
5.1.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
A summary of options for managing significant aging degradation in PWR containment structures through inservice inspec- 
tions, surveillance, monitoring, repair, and replacement is provided in Table 5.2. Containment structures and systems are 
subject to periodic leak rate testing, per 10 CFR 50 Appendix J, and to inspections of accessible exterior and interior surfaces 
for evidence of structural degradation before integrated leak-rate tests. For concrete structures, the inspection methods include 
visual, rebound, and core sampling, if required, and for the post-tensioning systems, a tendon surveillance program. Post-test 
inspections of concrete containments are required by technical specifications; additional requirements and guidance on 
preferred procedures are given in Regulatory Guide 1.35. Corrosion damage of the embedded portions of PWR metal 
containments is a major concern as is corrosion of both sides of the steel basemat liner or the outside surface of the liner on the 
below-grade wall of concrete containments. 
Table 5.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for PWR containment structures 
Reference 
S. 
-- 
p. 124 
PP . 
123-124 
p. 123 
PP. 
121-123 
p .  125 
PP. 
126-127 
PP. 
128-129 
PP . 
127-128 
p. 128 
PP. 
128-129 
-- 
-- 
Components 
All containments: 
Mechanical and 
electrical penetration 
assemblies 
Concrete 
containments: 
Concrete dome; 
Concrete 
containment wall 
above grade and 
below grade 
Steel containments: 
Concrete basemat 
All containments: 
Reinforcing steel 
Concrete 
containments: 
Containment and 
basemat liner, 
interior and exterior 
surfaces; Liner 
anchors aboveand 
below grade 
Concrete 
containments: 
Prestressing tendons 
Steel containments: 
Containment, 
interior and exterior 
surfaces; Sand 
pocket and 
embedded shell 
regions; Basemat 
liner and anchors 
Common components: 
Penetration sleeves; 
Personnel airlock; 
Equipment hatches; 
Dissimilar metal 
welds 
Penetration bellows 
'Unless otherwise noted, 
Aging Mechanisms Mnterids Aging Concerns 
Various 
(plant 
specific) 
Concrete 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
-- 
Stainless 
steel 
the references are 
Loss of containment integrity; 
Reduced electrical isolation 
(shorting) 
Radiation; humidity; 
temperature; chemical attack; 
moisture 
Loss of concrete strength and 
modulus 
Loss of moisture due to 
elevated temperature 
Scaling, cracking, and spalling Internal pressure due to 
freeze-thaw 
Increase of porosity and permeability Leaching of calcium hydroxide 
Increase of porosity and 
permeability; Cracking and spalling 
Aggressive chemical attack 
Expansion and cracking Reaction with aggregates 
Cracking and spalling of concrete; 
Loss strength 
Corrosion of embedded steel 
Loss of material Corrosion of structural steel 
and liner 
Loss of material Corrosion of tendons 
Reduction of design margin Loss of prestress 
Loss of material Corrosion of structural steel 
and liner 
-. -- 
-- - 
to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Table 5.2 Managing aging degradation for PWR containment structures 
Components 
All containments: 
Mechanical and electrical 
penetration assemblies 
Concrete containments: 
Concrete dome; Concrete 
containment wall, above 
grade and below grade 
Steel containments: 
Concrete basemat 
All containments: 
Reinforcing steel 
Concrete containments: 
prestressing tendons 
Concrete containments: 
Containment liner and 
basemat liner, interior and 
exterior surfaces; Liner 
anchors above and below 
grade 
Steel containments: 
Containment shell, interior 
and exterior surfaces; Sand 
pocket and embedded shell 
regions; Basemat liner and 
anchors 
Common components: 
Penetration sleeves; 
Personnel airlock, 
Equipment hatches; Dis- 
similar metal welds 
Penetration bellows 
'Unless otherwise noted, the 
hlaterials 
Various 
@lant 
specific) 
Concrete 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Carbon steel 
Stainless 
steel 
references are to 
Radiation; humidity; 
temperature; chemical attack, 
moisture 
Loss of moisture due to 
elevated temperature 
Internal pressure due to 
freeze-thaw 
Leaching of calcium 
hydroxide 
Aggressive chemical attack 
Reaction with aggregates 
Corrosion of embedded steel 
Corrosion of tendons 
Loss of prestress 
Corrosion 
Corrosion 
pages of Shah and MacDonald 
Testing of penetration assemblies 
(destructive and nondestructive) 
under normal and severe accident 
conditions 
Maintain required operating tem- 
peratures or perform 
plant-specific evaluation 
Ensure concrete mix meets 
requirements for weathering 
conditions. 
Ensure concrete meets permeabil- 
ity and crack control 
requirements. 
Limit exposure to aggressive 
ground water; Periodically 
inspect accessible below-grade 
surfaces; Perform plant-specific 
evaluation of inaccessible 
below-grade surfaces. 
Ensure aggregate meets 
specifications. 
Ensure concrete exposed to 
ground water meets specifica- 
tions; Periodically inspect 
accessible below-grade surfaces; 
Perform plant-specific evaluation 
of inaccessible below-grade 
surfaces 
Visual examination; Evaluate 
corrosion protection medium; 
Repair or replace 
Inspection and load monitoring, 
corrective action 
Ensure dissimilar metals not used 
and aggressive ground water not 
present; Visual inspection 
Ensure dissimilar metals not 
used; visual inspection 
(1993). 
References' 
Clauss (1989); 
Jacobus (1990); 10 
CFR 50 Appendix J 
ACI 349-90 
ASTM-C260-94 
ACI 201.2R-92 
ASME Section XI, 
Subsection IWL, 
examination category 
L-A 
ASTM C227-90; 
ASTM C295-85; 
ACI 201.2R-92 
ASME Section 111, 
Subsectibn CC 
Regulatory Guide 
1.35; ASME Section 
XI, Subsection IWL 
Regulatory Guide 1.35 
pp. 135-136 
pp. 139-140 
5.2 BWR Containment Structures 
This section addresses the management of BWR containment structures for the Mark I, 11, and I11 reactor designs. BWR 
containment structures provide a containment pressure boundary and leakcight bamer to radioactive release, limit interior 
pressure in the containment in the event of a LOCA, and provide a continuing source of water for ECCS. 
A typical steel Mark I containment, which is the predominant type of containment for BWRs in the United States is shown in 
Figure 5.4. A typical reinforced concrete Mark I1 containment, the second most predominant of U.S. BWRs, is shown in 
Figure 5.5. In addition to the two main types are a few steel Mark I1 and Mark I11 containments, reinforced concrete Mark I 
and Mark 111 containments, and prestressed Mark I1 containments; in general, components of these containments are affected 
by the same aging mechanisms that affect similar components in the two predominant types. 
I ! -1 11 fl diameter -, NW 0195 
Figure 5.4 BWR Mark I Type steel containment (Shah et al. 1994) 
basemat 
16 ?t 
Figure 5.5 BWR Mark Il Type reinforced concrete containment (Shah et al. 1989) 
A hpical Mark I11 containment, which ddfers from the Mark I and Mark I1 types by enclosing a much larger volume, is 
shown in Figure 5.6. 
The ma or components of the BWR containment structures generally fall in one of the following categories: the primary con- 
tainment structure (which provides containment pressure boundary) constructed either of freestanding steel, relnforced con- 
crete, or prestressed concrete, with the concrete containments lined with steel to provide a leaktight barrier to radioactive 
release; basemats for Mark I1 and 111 containments constructed of relnforced concrete that is lined with steel (which form the 
load bearing portion of the containment pressure boundary); the drywell (whch contains the RPV, recirculation system, and 
wetwell (or suppression chamber, torus-shaped in the Mark I design) and isolates the RPV from the reactor building while 
maintaining a vent path via downcomers to the wetwell); and the suppression pool (whch limits interior pressure in the con- 
tainment in the event of a LOCA and provides a continuing source of water for the ECCS). 
The containment structure components described in this section do not include the reactor building structures and basemats of 
the two Mark I concrete containments, the diaphragm floors and support columns of Mark I1 containments, or the drywell and 
weir walls of Mark I11 containments; these are discussed in Section 5.3 
Annulus 
Biological 
shield wall 
Shield building 
personnel door 
Annulus concrete 
Horizontal vents 
APV pedestal / equipment halch and Basernat penonnd door 
Figure 5.6 Mark IH Type metal containment enclosed in a concrete shield building (Shah et al. 1994) 
5.2.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
Containment structures for BWRs are fabricated from concrete (reinforced and prestressed), carbon steel, and austenitic SS. 
These materials have been susceptible to internal and external environmental stressors, such as moisture, elevated 
temperatures, freeze-thaw cycles, and cyclic loads (Shah and McDonald 1993, pp. 591-594). Aging degradation concerns 
considered to be significant for BWR reinforced concrete structures are 1) loss of strength and modulus due to elevated 
temperature, 2) scaling, cracking, and spalling due to freeze-thaw cycles, and 3) increase of porosity and permeability, crack- 
ing, and spalling due to leaching of calcium hydroxide, attack by aggressive chemicals, and reaction with aggregates. Aging 
degradation concerns considered to be significant for BWR steel structures and components are 1) cracking, spalling, loss of 
bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel, prestressing tendons, structural steel, and liners; 2) lockup of 
contact surfaces due to wear of penetrations, bracings, and supports; 3) cumulative fatigue damage of vent headers and 
downcomers due to fatigue; and 4) reduction in design margin due to loss of prestress in prestressing tendons. These 
significant aging degradation concerns and their mechanisms are summarized in Table 5.3. 
5.2.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
A summary of options for managing significant aging degradation in BWR containment structures through inservice inspection 
(ISI), surveillance, monitoring, repair, and replacement is provided in Table 5.4. Containment structures and systems are 
subject to periodic leak-rate testing, per 10 CFR 50 Appendix J ,  and to inspections of accessible exterior and interior surfaces 
for evidence of structural degradation before integrated leak-rate tests. For concrete structures, the inspection methods include 
visual, rebound, and core sampling, if required, and for the post-tensioning systems, a tendon surveillance program. Post-test 
inspections of concrete containments are required by technical specifications; additional requirements and guidance on 
preferred procedures are given in Regulatory Guide 1.35. Corrosion damage of the embedded portions of BWR metal 
containments, the inaccessible outside surfaces of the Mark I and ll drywells, and the ECCS piping that penetrates the torus 
are major concerns. 
5.3 Other Seismic Category I Structures 
Seismic Category I structures are multi-level structures consisting of reinforced concrete components (sometimes lined with 
steel plates to provide leak-tightness), masonry block walls, and structural steel and concrete-steel composite components that 
are supported on reinforced concrete foundationk (basemats and/or piles). The Seismic Category I structures treated in this 
section comprise the following groups: 1) BWR reactor building, PWR shield building, and control roomlbuilding; 2) BWR 
reactor building with steel superstructure; 3) auxiliary building, diesel generator building, radwaste building, turbine building, 
switchgear room, auxiliary feedwater pump house, and utilitylpiping tunnel; 4) containment internal structures (excluding 
refueling canal); 5) fuel storage facility and refueling canal; 6) intake structure, cooling tower, and spray pond; 7) concrete 
tanks; 8) steel tanks; and 9) BWR unit vent stack. The review covers reinforced concrete (including concrete and reinforcing 
steel), reinforced concrete foundations (including concrete, reinforcing steel, and piles), masonry block walls, structural carbon 
steel used in steel-framed and composite structures (including metal siding, decking, and roofing), and stainless steel and 
carbon steel liners and anchors. This section does not include BWR and PWR containment structures, which are covered in 
Sections 5.1 and 5.2, nor tunnels andlor canals associated with the circulating water system, nor embankments and dams. 
Table 5.3 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for BWR containment structures 
PNL-10717 PT. I 
Aging Mechanisms 
Radiation; Humidity; 
Temperature; 
Chemical attack; 
Moisture 
Elevated temperature 
Leaching of calcium 
hydroxide 
Reaction with 
aggregates 
Freeze-thaw cycles 
Aggressive chemical 
attack 
Corrosion of 
embedded steel 
Corrosion 
Local corrosion 
Fatigue 
Aging Concerns 
Loss of containment 
integrity; Reduced 
electrical isolation 
(shorting) 
Loss of concrete 
strength and modulus 
Increase of porosity 
and permeability 
Expansion and 
cracking 
Scaling, cracking, and 
spalling 
Increase of porosity 
and permeability, 
cracking, and spalling 
Cracking, spalling, 
loss of bond, and loss 
of material 
Loss of material 
Loss of material 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Components 
All containments: 
Mechanical and electrical penetration assemblies 
Concrete containments: 
Mark I drywell and torus; Mark I1 containment, con- 
Crete fill in the annulus, and basemat; Mark 111 
containment, containment wall above and below 
grade, and basemat 
Steel containments: 
Mark III basemat and concrete fill in the annulus 
Concrete containments: 
Mark III containment and containment wall above 
and below grade 
Concrete containments: 
Mark I drywell and torus; Mark I1 basemat; Mark 111 
containment wall below grade 
Steel containments: Mark 111 basemat 
Concrete containments: 
Reinforcement steel in Mark I drywell and torus; 
Mark I1 containment and basemat; Mark 111 
containment, containment wall below grade, and 
basemat 
Steel containments: 
Mark 111 basemat reinforcing steel 
Steel containments: 
Mark I ECCS suction header; Mark I1 suppression 
chamber exterior surface; Mark I and I1 drywell 
exterior surface; Uncoated surfaces of containment 
structures 
Common components: 
Dissimilar metal welds; Mark I torus and Mark I1 
suppression chamber, interior surface at waterline; 
Mark I and I1 downcomers and bracing; Mark I1 
region shielded by diaphragm floor 
Concrete containments: 
Prestressed tendons 
Steel containments: 
Mark I and 11 drywell exterior shell with 
compressible material; Mark I and Mark I1 drywell 
support skirt, sand pocket region; Mark I ,  11, and 111 
embedded shell region 
Concrete containments: 
Mark I and I1 vent header, downcomers and bracing 
Steel containments: 
Mark 1 vent header, downcomers and bracing; Mark 
I1 unbraced downcomers 
References' 
Kassir et al. 1993 
p. 603 
p. 603 
p. 603 
p. 600 
pp. 603-694 
p. 594 
p. 598 
pp. 600-601 
Materials 
Various 
(plant 
specific) 
Concrete 
Carbon steel 
Table 5.3 (Continued) 
5.3.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
The materials in Seismic Category I structures and components are susceptible to internal and external environmental stressors 
(moisture, aggressive chemicals, cyclic loads, etc.). Aging degradation concerns considered to be significant for Seismic 
Category I concrete structures are 1) scaling, cracking, and spalling due to freeze-thaw cycles; 2) increase of porosity and 
permeability, cracking, and spalling due to leaching of calcium hydroxide, attack by aggressive chemicals, and reaction with 
aggregates; 3) basemat cracking, distortion, and increase in component stress level due to settlement; 4) loss of material due to 
abrasion and cavitation; and 5) cracking of masonry walls due to restraint, shrinkage, creep, and aggressive environment. 
Aging degradation concerns considered to be significant for Seismic Category I steel structures and components are cracking, 
spalling, loss of bond, and loss of material due to corrosion of embedded steel, structural steel, and liners. The si
gnifi
cant 
aging concerns and the mechanisms that degrade components of Seismic Category I structures are summarized in Table 5.5. 
Components 
Common components: 
personnel airlock. equipment hatches. CRD hatch 
Concrete containments: 
Mark I and I1 drywell head, downcomers and 
bracing; Mark I vent system suppons 
Steel containments: 
Mark 1 and I1 drywell head, downcomers and 
bracing; Mark I vent system supports, torus suppon 
columnslsaddle and seismic restraints 
Concrete containments: 
Mark U containment concrete, prestress tendons 
Concrete containments: 
Mark I1 and 111 suppression chamber interior SS 
liners 
Steel containments: 
Mark 111 suppression chamber shell interior surface 
or cladding surface 
5.3.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
Aging Concerns 
Lockup 
Reduction of design 
margin 
Crack initiation and 
growth 
Materials 
Carbon 
steel, 
Graphite 
Concrete, 
Carbon steel 
Stainless 
steel 
The options for managing significant aging degradation in Seismic Category I structures through inservice inspections, surveil- 
lance, monitoring, repair, and replacement are summarized in Table 5.6. A primary requirement for aging management is to 
mitigate the consequences of LOCAs and potential off-site release of radioactive materials. 
Seismic Category I structures are subject to inspections of accessible exterior surfaces for evidence of structural degradation. 
Corrosion damage of the embedded steel reinforcements and structural steel and liners is a major concern as is loss of strength 
and cracking o masonry walls in proximity to, or having attachments from, safety-related piping or equipment. 
Aging Mechaaisms 
Wear 
Loss of prestress 
Stress corrosion 
cracking 
References' 
p .  601 
p. 604 
Lee and 
Szklarska- 
Smulowska 1988 
Table 5.4 Managing aging degradation for BWR containment structures 
r 
Components 
All containments: 
Mechnnicnl nnd electr~cal penetrntion 
assemblies 
Concrete containments: 
Mnrk 1 drywell and t o m :  Mnrk I1 contain- 
ment, concrete fill m the nnnulu., nnd 
bnsemnt; Mnrk I11 contnmment, containment 
wnll above and below grade, and basemat 
Steel contninmenls: 
Mark 111 bnsemnt and concrete fill in the 
Mnulus 
Concrete contninments: 
Mnrk 111 containment and containment wnll 
nbove and below grnde 
Concrete contninments: 
Mnrk I drywell and torus; Mnrk I1 basemnt; 
Mnrk III containment wnll below grade 
Steel containments: Mnrk 111 bnsemnt 
Concrete contninments: 
Reinforcement steel in Mnrk I drywell md 
torus; Mark I1 contninment and bnsemat: 
Mnrk In  contninment, containment wall 
below grnde. ~d bnsemnt 
Steel containments: 
Mnrk III bnsemnt remforcing steel 
Steel contninments: 
Murk I ECCS suction header: Mnrk I1 sup- 
pression chnmber exterior surfnce: Mnrk 1 
nnd I1 drywell exterior surface: Unconted 
surfnces of containment structures 
Common components: 
Dissimilnr metal welds; Mark I t o m  and 
Mnrk I1 suppression chamber, interior 
surfnce at waterline; Mnrk 1 and I1 down- 
comers and bracing; Mark I1 region shielded 
by dinphrngm floor 
Concrete containments; 
Prestressed tendons 
Steel contninments: 
Mark I and I1 drywell exterior shell with 
compressible mnterinl; Mnrk I and Mark I1 
drywell support skirt, snnd pocket region; 
Mnrk I. 11. and III embedded shell region 
Concrete contninments: 
Mnrk I nnd I1 vent header, downcomers and 
brncing 
Steel contninments: 
Mark I vent header. downcomers md 
brncing: Mnrk 11 unbrnced downcomers 
Agi ip  Mechanisms 
Rndintion: Humidity: 
Temperature: 
Chemicnl nttock: 
Moisture 
Elevnted temperature 
Lenching. of calcium 
hydroxide 
Reaction with 
nggregntes 
Freezethnw cycles 
Aggressive chemical 
nttnck 
Corrosion of 
embedded steel 
Corrosion 
Local corrosion 
Fatigue 
Materials 
Vnrious 
(plant 
specific) 
Concretr 
Carbon steel 
Management Options 
Testing of penetrntion assemblies 
(destructive and nondestructive under 
normal md severe accident conditions 
Mnintnin required operating tem- 
perntures or perform plml-specific 
evaluntion. 
Ensure concrete meets permeability 
and crnck control requirements. 
Ensure nggregnte meets specifications. 
Ensure concrete mix meets require- 
ments for weathering conditions. 
Limit exposure of above-ground sur- 
fncea to aggressive ground water to in- 
tennitlent periods. Periodically inspect 
accessible below-grade surfaces. 
Perform plant-specific evaluation of 
innccessible below-grade surfnces. 
Ensure concrete of above-ground sur- 
faces exposed to ground water meets 
specifications. Periodically inspect 
accessible below-grade surfaces. 
Perform plant-specific evaluation of 
inaccessible below-grade surfnces. 
VT-I inspection of surfaces likely to 
experience accelernted corrosion, 
VT-3 examination of containment 
shell welds, nnd VT-3 exnminntion of 
accessible containment pressure 
boundary in conjunction with 10 CFR 
50 Appendix J Type A leak rnte teat. 
Periodic VT- I inspection of surfaces 
likely to experience accelerated 
corrosion; A plmt-specific prognun is 
required for inacwible  andlor 
embedded carbon steel containment 
components. Examine tendon mchor- 
age hardware. evaluate. corrosion 
protection medium. 
Perform fatigue rt-analysis; consider 
effects of environmentally minted 
fatigue crack initiation and growth. 
R e f e r e n d  
Claws (1989); 
Jacobw (1990) 
10 CFR 50 
Appendix J 
ACI 349-90 
ACI 201.2R-92 
ASTM C227-90. 
ASTM C295-85. 
ACI 201.2R-92 
ASTM-C260-94 
ACI 318-92 
ASME Section III. 
Division 2 
ASME Section XI, 
Subsection IWE exam 
categories E-A. E-P, 
and E-C, 
reupectively; 10 CFR 
50 Appendix J 
ASME Section XI. 
Subsection IWE 
examination category 
E-C 
Regulatory Guide 
1.35 
ASME Section XI. 
Subsection IWE 
Table 5.4 (Continued) 
Components 
Common components: 
personnel nirlock, equipment britches, CRD 
hutch 
Concrete contninments: 
Mark I nnd I1 drywell head, downcomers nnd 
brncing: Mnrk I vent system supports 
Steel contninments: 
Murk I nnd I1 drywell bend, downcomers nnd 
bmcing; Mnrk I vent system supports, toms 
supper( columns/snddle nnd seismic restraints 
Concrete contninment$: 
Mark I1 contninment concrete. prestress 
tendons 
Concrete contninments: 
Mnrk I1 md I11 suppression chnmber interior 
SS liners 
Steel contnuunents: 
Mnrk UI suppression chnmber shell lnterlor 
surfnce or clndding surfnce 
'Unless otherwise noted. the references nre to pnges of Shnh nnd MncDonnld (1993). 
Materials 
Cnrbon 
steel. 
Grnph~te 
Concrete. 
Cnrbon steel 
Stnmless 
steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wenr 
Loss of prestress 
Stress corrosion 
crncking 
Management Options 
Exnmine nirlock. equipment hutches. 
CRD batch nnd drywell bead every 
inspection intervnl (10 yrs): VT-I 
exnmination of bolted connections. 
VT-3 examinntion of seals nnd 
penetmtions, and VT-3 exnminntion of 
bmcings. restraints, nnd supporls. 
periodic monitoring of prestressing 
losses in accordmce with tendon 
lift-off test 
Detection of liner lenknge vin 
lOCFR5O Appendix J Type A lenk mte 
test: repnir, replncement, nnd retest 
Refemnces' 
ASME Section XI, 
Subsection IWE nnd 
IWF 
Regulatory Guide 
1.35 
10 CFR 50 Appendix 
J. ASME Section XI. 
Subsection IWE 
Table 5.5 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for other Seismic Category I structures 
below grade (ExB), interior concrete walls including columns (InW), interior concrete slabs including beams (Ins), and interior concrete 
structures above grade @A). Structural steel components include columns, baseplates, beams, girders, trusses, and bracings; and jet 
impingement barriers for Groups 1-4. 
bWith embedded reinforcing carbon steel. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Internal pressure 
due to freeze-thaw 
cycles 
Leaching of calcium 
hydroxide 
Aggressive chemical 
attack 
Reaction with 
aggregates 
Restraint; 
Shrinkage; Creep; 
Aggressive 
environment 
Settlement 
Corrosion of 
embedded steel 
Abrasion and 
cavitation 
Corrosion of stain- 
less steel liner 
Corrosion of 
structural steel 
concrete above grade 
Aging Concerns 
Scaling, cracking, 
and spalling 
Increase of 
porosity and 
permeability 
Increase of 
porosity and 
permeability, 
cracking, and 
spalling 
Expansion and 
cracking of 
concrete 
Cracking of 
masonry walls 
Basemat cracking; 
Distortion; Increase 
in component stress 
level 
Cracking, spelling, 
loss of bond, and 
loss of material of 
steel 
Loss of Material 
Loss of material 
Loss of material 
concrete piles (F), exterior 
Components 
GROUP 1 
BWR reactor building, 
PWR shield building, Control 
room/building 
GROUP 2 
BWR reactor building with steel 
superstructure 
GROUP 3 
Auxiliary building, Diesel generator 
building, Radwaste building, Turbine 
building Switchgear room, Auxiliary 
feedwater pump house, Utilitylpiping 
tunnel 
GROUP 4 
Containment internal structures 
(excluding refueling canal) 
GROUP 5 
Fuel storage facility, Refueling canal 
GROUP 6 
Intake structure, Cooling tower, Spray 
pond 
GROUP 7 
Concrete tanks 
GROUP 9 
BWR unit vent stack 
GROUP 8 
Steel tanks 
GROUP 6 
Intake structure, Cooling tower, Spray 
pond 
GROUP 5 
Fuel storage facility, Refueling canal 
GROUP 6 
Intake structure, Cooling tower, Spray 
pond 
'Component types are as follows: Concrete 
References 
S t u m p  et al. 1987 
Troxell et a1. 1968 
Mehta 1986 
Mehta 1986 
IE Bulletin 80-1 1 ; 
Information Notice 
87-67 
Bowles 1988 
AC1222R-85 
ACI 210R-92 
EPRI NP-3765; 
EPRI NP-4561 
ANSUAISC N690 
(ExA), exterior concrete 
Materials' 
C ~ n c r e t e : ~  F, ExA. 
InW. Ins, interior and 
exterior concrete, 
concrete above and 
below grade; masonry 
block walls 
Concrete: F, ExA, ExB, 
& Ins 
Stainless steel liner 
Structural steel 
foundation including 
Table 5.6 Managing aging degradation for other Seismic Category I structures 
Components 
GROUP 1 
BWR renctor building. PWR shield 
building. Control roomlbuildmg 
GROUP 2 
BWR reactor building with ~teel  
superstructure 
GROUP 3 
Auxilinry building. Diesel generntor 
building. Rndwaste building. Turbine 
building. Switchgear room. Auxilrnry 
feedwater pump house. Utilitylpiping 
tunnel 
GROUP 4 
Containment internal structures (excluding 
refueling cannl) 
GROUP 5 
Fuel storage fncility. Refueling cnnnl 
GROUP 6 
Intoke structure. Cooling tower. Sprny 
pond 
GROUP 7 
Concrete tnnks 
GROUP 9 
BWR unit vent stnck 
GROUP 8 
Steel topks 
GROUP 6 
Intake structure, Cooling tower. Sprny 
pond 
All Groups 
GROUP 5 
Fuel storage facility. Refueling cnnnl 
GROUP 6 
Intnke structure. Cooling tower, Spray 
pond 
'Component types are as follows: Concrete 
mterior concrete walLs including columns 
components include columns, baseplates, beams, g~rders, trusses. and bmcings: and jet impingement barriers for Groups 1-4. 
w i th  embedded reinforcing cnrbon steel. 
Mnnnpement Owions 
Ensure concrete mix meets 
requirements for weathering 
conditions 
Ensure concrete meets 
permeability and crack control 
requirements. 
Limit exposure of above-ground 
surfnces to aggressive ground 
water to intermitrent periods. 
Periodically inspect accessible 
below-grade surfnces. Perform 
plant-specific evaluation of 
inaccessible below-grnde surfnces. 
Ensure aggregate meets 
specificntions. 
Identify mnsonry walls in close 
proximity to, or hnving 
atlochments from. safety-related 
piping or equipment, and 
reevaluate design adequacy and 
coostruction pmcticcs; and 
perform plant-specific corrective 
actions. 
Monitor settlement during con- 
struction, and continue monitoring 
during operation for sites with soft 
soil andlor signir~cant changes in 
ground water conditions. 
Periodic inspections. not to exceed 
5-year intervals. including engi- 
neering data compilation and 
inspection and evaluation of con- 
crete surfaces., structural cracking. 
and water parsage 
Ensure concrete of 8bov~groIIIId 
surfaces exposed to ground water 
meets specifications. Visual 
inspection of acccauible exterior 
w& below ground water table to 
determine if maoagemcnt of 
ground water and degnuiation of 
concrete is required 
Leakage detection and inventory 
monitoring. and repair 
Periodic hrspections, not to exceed 
5-year intervals. including engi- 
neering datn compilation and 
inspection and evaluation of con- 
crete suhces ,  structural cracking, 
and water passage 
above grade (ExA), exterior concrete 
interior concrete structures above grade 
hlaterials' 
C~ncre t e :~  F. ExA. InW, 
Ins, mterior nnd exterior 
concrete. concrete above 
nnd below grnde: mnsonrj 
block walls 
Concrete: F, ExA. ExB, 
and InS 
Concrete with embedded 
or reinforcing carbon steel 
Stainless steel liner 
Structural steel 
foundntion including concrete 
OnW), interior concrete slabs 
Referpncea 
ACI 349-90 
ACI 201.2R-92 
ACI 349-90; ACI 207 
31-79; Regulatory 
Guide 1.127 
ASTM (227-90; 
ASTM C295-90; ACI 
201.2R-92 
IE Bulletin 80-1 1 ; 
Information Notice 
87-67 
Circulnr 81-08; 
Regulatory Guide 
1.132 
Regulatory Guide 
1 .I27 
ACI 349-90; ACI 207 
3R-79 
Regulatory Guide 
1 .I27 
below grade (ExB), 
(Id). Structural steel 
Aging Mechanisms 
lntemnl pressure 
due to freeze-thaw 
cycles 
Lenching of 
cnlcium hydroxide 
Aggressive 
chemicnl nunck 
Reaction with 
aggregates 
Restraint; 
Shrinknge; Creep: 
Aggressive 
environment 
Settlement 
Abrasion and 
cavitation 
Corrosion of 
embedded steel 
Corrosion of stain- 
less steel Liner 
Corrosion of 
s t ruc~ra l  steel 
piles (F). exterior concrete 
including buuns (Ins), and 
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6 Cables, Connectors, and Splices 
This chapter addresses the aging degradation of cables used within the containment of LWRs. The cables are used to transfer 
energy and signals to operate, monitor, and control the reactor. The cables are used in power, instrumentation, and control 
applications. This chapter also addresses aging degradation of the cable splices and connectors that are used with the cables. 
Cables within nuclear power plants have an excellent performance history for normal plant operating conditions. Based on a 
review of licensee event report (LER) databases, the number of cable failures is relatively small, and those that occur usually 
result from handling during installation and maintenance, or from exposure to localized high temperature, radiation, or 
humidity conditions. The primary safety concern is the performance of aged cable if it is exposed to the harsh environments 
expected to result from design basis and post design-basis accident conditions. 
The principal cable materials, construction, manufacturing, and testing standards are those issued by the Insulated Cable Engi- 
neers Association (ICEA) and the National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA). Specific safety cable qualification 
requirements are contained in 10 CFR 50.49. This rule is based on the Division of Operating Reactors Guidelines (NRC 
1979) and NUREG-0588 (NRC 1981). The principal standard for qualification of cables is IEEE Std 323, Standard for 
QualiJLing Class 1E Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. The standard for cable testing is IEEE Std 383, 
Standurd for Type Test of Class IE Electric Cables; Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generm'ng Stations. 
Regulatory Guides 1.89 and 1 .I31 apply to the qualification of cables, splices, and connectors. Recently a new voluntary 
standard, Standard IEEE 1205, Guidt for Assessing, Monitoring, and Mitigating Aging Eflects on Class 1E Equipment Used in 
Nuclear Power Generating Stations, was introduced to provide general guidance for aging concerns. 
Examples of construction for cables typically used in nuclear power plants are shown in Figure 6.1. The major cable com- 
ponents include the conductor, insulation, shield, and jacket. The cable conductor is typically stranded (many small diameter 
copper wires clustered together without insulation) or single copper wires insulated from each other in a cluster. While 
stranded conductors are more susceptible to corrosion (high surfaceto-volume ratio), they are more flexible and less likely to 
be damaged due to vibration or handling. 
Cables and connectors are usually insulated using polymer-based compounds (except for some mineral-insulated cable). The 
main function of the insulation is to isolate electrical conductors from grounding. In some applications the insulation also 
serves to maintain high direct current resistivity, low alternating current losses, or proper concentricity of conductor and 
shield. The most important dielectric properties are breakdown strength and insulation resistance. 
The jacket provides protection to the rest of the cable and maintains the vital hermetic sealing of the cable. Jacket materials 
protect both individual wires and multiconductor cables. There are certain minimum electrical requirements for the jacket; 
however, the materials are selected primarily on the basis of mechanical, environmental resistance, and firesuppressing 
properties. 
The shield on low-voltage cable serves to isolate circuits from one another and from outside interference. The shield provides 
a constant circuit electrical impedance and ensures proper transmission of high-frequency or pulse signals. The shield also 
helps to prevent cable jacket cracks from propagating into the insulation. 
Examples of cable splice assemblies are shown in Figure 6.2. Permanent cable splices are used in LWR containments to 
reduce the number of connection joints that have to be maintained. Splices are used in new plant designs, and they generally 
have been used to replace terminal strips in the older plants. Splices use crimped wire connectors and waterproof shrink 
tubing to seal the splice. This design allows use of simplified installation procedures and helps to detect errors during assem- 
bly. The splice is designed to maintain continuity of cable component functions and provides an environmental seal. 
Elz:hYT Rubber 
insulation , stranded 
Single stranded conductor power cable. 
Yket shield 
Stranded conductor 
Coaxial instrumentation cable 
, Insulated 
conduction 
Multlconductor control cable 
Figure 6.1 Examples of cable construction for cables used in nuclear power plants (Gardner and Meyer 1989) 
A cable multiconductor connector and its components are illustrated in Figure 6.3. The cable connector is a device located at 
the cable ends that ensures functional continuity of the cable conductor, insulation, shield, and acket by sealing them from 
the environment. Usually the connectors are fabricated as mating @in and sleeve) devices to match in the field. Multi- 
conductor connectors often have outer gasket-type seals and inner seals made of filler compounds or sealing cements that sur- 
round the individual conductors. 
NPK - Nuclear Plant Splice Kit 
NPKV - Nuclear Plant Stub Connection Kit ("V") 
Figure 6.2 Raychem NPK and NPKV splice assemblies (Gardner and Meyer 1989) 
Connector features 
1-Molded onepiece contact retention disc 
2-Fluorosilicone fluid resistant 
seal material. 
3Closed entry sodrat insert and contacts. 
48ayonet coupling system. 
5 5  key shell polarization. 
Blntertacial mating sad. 
7-Static peripheral shall seal. 
eMonobtock construc?ion- 
inserts bonded to shells. 
4Seli-sealing rear grommets. 
1GViual mating indicators. 
11SheRto-shell grounding 
fingem. 
12-Accepts Mil-C38999 hardware. 
13Condudive shell finish. 
Figure 6.3 Amphenol 418 Series multiconductor connector (Gardner and Meyer 1989) 
6.1 Aging Degradation Concerns and Mechanisms 
The aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for LWR cable materials are summarized in Table 6.1. Materials commonly 
used for the conductor, shield, insulation, and jacket components are listed in the table. Not all materials nor possible 
variations in design (e.g., bare or tinned metal structure) are included. The non-metallic materials employ different com- 
pounds: adders (like antioxidants), fillers, fire retardants, curing agents, etc. 
Table 6.1 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for LWR cable materials 
Components 
Conductors 
Shields (on low- 
voltage cables) 
Insulation and jacket' 
This  is not a complete 
listed. 
b ~ g i n g  stressors caused by steam condensation and high temperature, pressure, and radiation from a design-basis event are important 
concerns. 
"Aging of conductors and shields is accelerated by exposure to moisture and air due to damaged jackets and insulation; and defective seals at 
splices and connectors. Aging of all components is accelerated by manufacturing defects, installation damage, overload currents, 
currentlvoltage surges, movementlflexing during maintenance, vibration, thermal cycling, chemicals from interfaces, surface dust, and 
distortion pressures due to sharp bends, thermal expansion rate differences, hot spots, support variations, clamps, etc. 
%e references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald (1993). 
T h e  aging rates of insulation and jacket materials have substantial differences between materials and within each material (density, 
structure, cross-linkage, etc., variations). 
Aging Mechanisms 
Medium corrosion 
Low corrosion 
Medium corrosion 
Medium corrosion 
Low corrosion 
Medium corrosion 
High corrosion 
Radiation, oxidation, 
and thermal damage at 
local hot spots; 
Moisture and chemical 
absorption and 
diffusion; Wear; 
Chemical reactions 
design (e.g., bare. or tinned 
Materials' 
Stranded copper 
Solid copper 
Nickel-plated 
copper 
Braided copper 
Tinned copper tape 
Aluminum foil 
Metallized mylar 
tape 
Polyester (unfilled) 
Nylon 
Polyethylene 
Neoprene 
Eth lens lene 
Hypalon 
XLPE 
Butyl rubber 
Kapton 
Silicone 
list of materials used for 
Referencesd 
pp. 827-830 
pp. 827-830; pp. 850- 
85 1 
pp. 827-833; pp. 845- 
853 
metal structure) are also not 
Aging Concernsb.' 
Conductivity loss; High 
surface to area ratio; 
Exposure to air and 
moisture 
Conductivity loss; 
Exposure to air and 
moisture 
Increased interference and 
improper signal trans- 
mission; Exposure to air 
and moisture 
Shrinking, creeping, thin- 
ning, embrinlement, cross- 
linkinglscissioning, and 
cracking; Current leaking, 
shorting: Aging 
accelerat~on in areas with 
high temperature, 
radiation, and humidity; 
LOSS of dielectric 
properties 
these components. Variations in 
The principal aging mechanism for conductors is corrosion. The conductor material and design has an effect on the rate of 
corrosion. The main aging concern of the conductor is exposure to air and moisture (e.g., steam). A high surfaceto-volume 
ratio for stranded conductors makes them especially susceptible to corrosion. Corrosion of the conductor will increase the 
resistance at the affected region, reducing cable functional performance, causing local heat generation rates to increase, and 
ultimately fail the cable. As long as the other cable components, splices, and connectors perform their function to seal the con- 
ductors from moisture, the corrosion activity is not likely to occur. 
The shield is made of metal, and like conductors, corrosion is the principal aging mechanism. Sealing the shield from mois- 
ture and air will prevent corrosion. Corrosion will degrade the shield and lead to increased interference and improper signal 
transmission between instruments, controls, and measurement devices. 
The insulation and jacket are constructed of non-metallic materials that are susceptible to damage from radiation, heat, and oxi- 
dation in the harsher local environments of containment. Chemical reactions and moisture and chemical absorption and dif- 
fusion are prolific at higher temperatures. Cable movement from pulling, bending, turning, etc., and vibration can also 
degrade the cables. These mechanisms can all contribute to damage of the jacket and insulation and subsequently the shield 
and conductor as well. The damage caused to the material is shrinking, creeping, thinning, embrittlement, material cross- 
linking, scissioning, and cracking. Jacket and insulation failure leads to corrosion of the shield and conductor components, 
electrical current leakage, and shorting of the cable. 
Aging concerns that can directly or indirectly affect all of the components include defective seals at splices and connectors; 
aging acceleration caused by manufacturing defects, installation damage, overload currents, currentlvoltage surges, movement1 
flexing of the cable during maintenance, thermal cycling, chemicals from component interfaces, surface dust and dirt, and 
cable distortion due to sharp bends; component material thermal expansion rate differences, hot spots, support variations, 
clamps, etc. These aging acceleration mechanisms and concerns will also affect splices and connectors. 
The aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for the cable splices are outlined in Table 6.2. The two principal components 
are the tubinglsealant and crimp. The tubinglsealant is non-metal, and it is subject to the same aging mechanisms and concerns 
as the cable jacket and insulation described above. It also has the same accelerated aging concerns. The tubinglsealant 
component is important to prevent moisture and air exposure to the joint and the cable components. The copper crimp 
component is subject to corrosion if exposed to air and moisture. Corrosion will cause the crimp to increase the resistance at 
the joint and degrade the cable service functions. 
The aging and degradation concerns and mechanisms of the cable connectors are described in Table 6.3. The main aging 
mechanism of the pin and socket contact components are wear of the gold-plated copper interfaces during connector assembly1 
disassembly operations. If exposed, the copper becomes susceptible to corrosion from moisture and air. There is also a 
Table 6.2 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms for LWR cable splices 
Components 
Tubing and 
sealant 
Crimp 
'Aging stressors caused by steam condensation and high temperature, pressure, and radiation from a design-basis event 
are important concerns. 
b ~ g i n g  of splices is accelerated by exposure to moisture and air, overload currents, curre.nt/voltage surges, movement1 
flexing during maintenance, vibration, thermal cycling, chemicals from interfaces, surface dust, and distortion 
pressures due to sharp turns, thermal expansion rate differences, hot spots, support variations, clamps, etc. 
T h e  references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald 1993. 
Materials 
WCSF-N 
Copper 
Aging 
ConcernsLb 
Cracking and 
leakage 
Increased 
res~stance; 
Exposure to air 
and moisture; 
Loosening 
Aging Mechanisms 
Radiation, oxidation, and 
thermal damage; Moisture and 
chemical absorption and 
diffusion; Wear; Chemical 
reactions 
Corrosion; Thermal cycling 
References' 
pp. 833, 834, 842, 
853 
pp. 833, 835, 838- 
842, 850, 851, 853 
Table 6.3 Aging degradation concerns and mechanisms of LWR cable connectors 
potential of gold solder interaction. A loss of good contact in the connector will cause a loss of conductivity through the joint 
and increase the resistance to degrade the cable performance. The retention disclinsert and grommetslseal components are 
susceptible to the aging mechanisms of radiation, oxidation, and thermal damage like other non-metals in the cable system. 
They also are subject to wear during assembleldisassembly operations. The materials can also be degraded by moisture and 
chemical activity. It is important for these components to maintain their integrity to prevent moisture and air migration to the 
cable ends at the joint. 
6.2 Managing Aging Degradation 
Components 
Pin and socket contacts 
Hood 
Shell; Coupling ring 
Retention disc and 
inserts 
Grommets and seals 
Bayonet rivets 
Finish (shells and 
coupling ring) 
The options for managing aging degradation of LWR cables, splices, and connectors are summarized in Tables 6.4, 6.5, and 
6.6, respectively. The management options are similar for all three items and their components. 
This  is not a complete list of matertals used for these components. 
b ~ g i n g  caused by steam condensation and high temperature, pressure, and radiation from a design-basis event are important concerns. 
"Aging of connectors is accelerated by seals being exposed to moisture and air. Aging of all components is accelerated by overload currents, 
current/voltage surges, movementlflexing during maintenance. vibration, thermal cycling, chemicals from interfaces, distortion pressures due 
to sharp turns, thermal expansion rate differences, hot spots, support variations, etc. 
"Ile references are to pages of Shah and MacDonald 1993. 
hlaterials' 
Gold-plated 
copper 
Stamless steel 
Aluminum 
Thermoplastic 
polymer 
Fluorosilicone 
elastomers 
Stainless steel 
Cadmium plate 
over nickel 
Aging Concernsb.' 
Loss of 
conductivity; 
Increased resistance 
-- 
.- 
Material 
degradation 
Cracking; leaking 
air and moisture 
-. 
-- 
In Table 6.4, the cable aging management options include a basic monitoring of local environmental radiation and temperature 
"hot spots" within containment. Special focus should be given to monitoring cables that are located in or near the environ- 
mental "hot spots" and other known cable high stress areas (e.g, cable turns, clamps, heavy condensation regions). 
Examples of typical areas to monitor are where cables pass through fire stops, areas in terminal boxes where cables are heated 
by their connection to high-temperature equipment, high humidity and steam exposure areas, and areas in narrow passages that 
contain both hot piping and cables. Routine visual and infrared survey examinations of open runs, terminal areas, and areas of 
known local high stressors provide a good means to detect abuse or aging degradation. Insulation resistance tests and cable 
indenter (currently in advanced development) tests can also be periodically performed and trended in those type of areas. 
Other nondestructive cable condition monitoring equipment has been under development and should be observed for the 
eventual availability of practical equipment. It is important to maintain records on inspections and tests performed on cables, 
splices, and connectors. Failures should be analyzed, and corrective action must be taken. It is important for operations and 
maintenance staff to be trained in how to monitor and handle cables, splices, and connectors. All of the management options 
discussed in this paragraph apply to cable splices and connectors as well. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wear with use; corrosion; gold- 
solder interaction 
-. 
-- 
Wear with use; radiation, 
thermal, and oxidation damage 
Radiation, thermal, and 
oxidation damage; moisture 
absorption; wear 
-- 
-- 
Referencesd 
pp. 833, 834, 842, 843, 
851, 863-866 
Table 6.4 Managing aging degradation of LWR cable materials 
In Table 6.5 the management options for cable connectors are, in general, the same as for the cables themselves. While the 
splices are being made it is important to keep the components dry and clean. It is important to minimize the movement of the 
splices. The splices can be monitored during the routine visual and infrared inspection of the cables. 
The aging management options in Table 6.6 focus on maintenance to keep the connectors clean and dry. The assembly, dis- 
assembly, and handling operations should be minimized to keep the contacts from being worn excessively. The components of 
the connectors need to be inspected during the assembly/disassembly process to ensure that the contact and sealing integri-ties 
are maintained. The connectors should be routinely monitored by visual and infrared inspection along with the cables and 
splices. 
Components 
Conductors 
Shields (on 
low-voltage 
cables) 
Insulation and 
jacket 
Table 6.5 Managing aging degradation of LWR cable splices 
'Unless otherwise noted, the references are to papes of Shah and MacDonald 1993. 
Management Options 
Perform periodic visual inspection and 
insulation resistance and cable indenter tests 
in areas of known high local stress; monitor 
containment temperature and radiation hot 
spots where cables are located; monitor for 
hot spots (infrared survey) and defective 
seals at cable splices, connectors, and 
terminals; minimize cable disturbance; keep 
connectors and terminals clean and dry; 
perform record keeping, staff training, and 
failure analysis; use condition monitoring 
equipment when it is sufficiently developed 
and is practical. 
References' 
pp. 854-869; 
IEEE 1205 
Materiah 
Stranded copper 
Solid copper 
Nickel-plated 
copper 
Braided copper 
Tinned dapper tape 
Aluminum foil 
Metallized mylar 
tape 
Polyester (unfilled) 
Nylon 
Polyethylene 
Neoprene 
Ethylene propylene 
Hypalon 
XLPE 
Butyl rubber 
Kapton 
Silicone 
Aging 
Mechanisms 
Medium corrosion 
Low corrosion 
~ ~ d i ~ ~  corrosion 
~ ~ d i ~ ~  corrosion 
Low corrosion 
Medium corrosion 
High corrosion 
Radiation, 
oxidation, and 
thermal damage; 
Moisture and 
chemical absorp- 
tion and diffusion; 
Wear; Chemical 
reactions 
Components 
Tubing and 
sealant 
Crimp 
Materials 
WCSF-N 
Copper 
Aging Mechanisms 
Radiation, oxidation, and thermal 
damage; Moisture and chemical 
absorption and diffusion; Wear; 
Chemical reactions 
Corrosion 
Management Options 
Monitor splices for hot spots 
by infrared survey; Periodic 
visual inspection; Minimize 
cable disturbance; Staff 
training 
References 
pp. 856, 866 
(Shah and 
MacDonald 
1993) 
Table 6.6 Managing aging degradation of LWR cable connectors 
6.3 References 
10 CFR 50.49. U.S. Cook of Federal Regulations. 1988. "Environmental Qualification of Electric Equipment Important to 
Safety for Nuclear Power Plants." U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
Components 
Pin and socket contacts 
Hood 
Shell; Coupling ring 
Retention disc and 
inserts 
Grommets and seals 
Bayonet rivets 
Finish (shells and 
coupling ring) 
Gardner, J.B., and L.C. Meyer. 1989. "Pressurized Water Reactor and Boiling Water Reactor Cables and Connections in 
Containment." In Residual Life Assessment of Major Light Water Reactor Components - Overview Volume 2,  eds., V.N. Shah 
and P.E. MacDonald. NUREGICR-4731 (EGG-2469) Volume 2, pp. 300-329, prepared by EG&G Idaho, Inc. for the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
This  is not a complete list of materials used for these components. 
Management Options 
Minimize disturbance; 
Monitor for hot spots by 
infrared survey; Monitor 
seals; Periodic visual 
inspection; Keep clean and dry 
(especially when connecting in 
moist areas); Staff training 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 323. 1983 (Reaftinned 1990). Standard for Qualzting Class IE 
Equipment for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, New York. 
Mnteriak' 
Gold-plated copper 
Stainless steel 
Aluminum 
Thermoplastic polymer 
Fluorosilicone 
elastomers 
Stainless steel 
Cadmium plate over 
nickel 
References 
pp. 842, 843,851, 
853, 855, 856, 863 
(Shah and 
MacDonald 1993) 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Std 383. 1974 (Reaffmed 1992). Standard for Type Test of Class 1E 
Electric Cables; Field Splices and Connections for Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Institute of Electrical and Electronics 
Engineers, New York. 
Aging Mechanisms 
Wear with use; 
Corrosion; Gold-solder 
interaction 
-- 
-- 
Wear with use; Radia- 
tion, thermal, and 
oxidation damage 
Radiation. thermal, and 
oxidation damage; Mois- 
ture absorption; Wear 
-- 
.. 
Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) 1205. 1993. Guia2 for Assessing, Monitoring, and Mitig
ati
ng Aging 
Effects on Class 1E Equipment Used in Nuclear Power Generating Stations. Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, 
New York. 
Shah, V.N., and P.E. MacDonald, eds. 1993. Aging and Life Extension of Major Light Water Reactor Components. Elsevier 
Publishing, New York. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 1977. QualiJication Tests of Electric Cables, Field Splices, and Connections 
for Light-water-cooled Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guide 1.131, Rev. 0, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, 
Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Nuclear Regualtory Commission (NRC). 1979. "Division of Operating Reactors @OR) Guidelines." U.S. Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Nuclear Regualtory Commission (NRC). 1981. Interim Staf Position on Environmenral Qualij?cation of Safely-Related 
Elecrrical Equipment: Including StaflResponses to Public Comments. NUREG-0588, Rev. 1 ,  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission, Washington, D.C. 
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 1984. Environmental QualiJication of Cerrain Electric Equipment Important to 
Safep for Nuclear Power Plants. Regulatory Guide 1.89, Rev. 1,  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, D.C. 
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